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THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
1977 AMENDMENTS
JOHN F. YETrER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Supreme Court amended the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective July 1, 1977.1 This article will discuss the im-
portance of the 1977 amendments. Many of them are technical and
will not have great significance in the daily practice of criminal law,
but some of the others are quite significant.
The court has made substantial changes in Rule 3.130, "Pretrial
Release," to make the decision on conditions of release similar to,
but in many important respects different from, those called for by
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. Rule 3.131, "Pretrial Probable
Cause Determinations and Adversary Preliminary Hearings," was
amended to explicitly permit resubmission of the probable cause
issue after an initial finding of no probable cause. Rule 3.171, "Plea
Discussions and Agreements," now describes more completely the
prosecutorial and defense obligations in plea bargaining. The amend-
ments created a new rule, Rule 3.172, "Acceptance of Guilty or Nolo
Contendere Plea," which specifies in detail the judicial obligations in
accepting guilty and nolo pleas. This new rule also provides that a
defendant who pleads guilty, or nolo contendere without the express
reservation of the right to appeal, waives his right to appeal. Finally,
Rule 3.210, "Competency To Stand Trial and Be Sentenced: Insanity
as a Defense," was extensively rewritten to specify new and detailed
procedures to govern the competency to stand trial decision and the
disposition of the defendant upon an insanity acquittal. This rule was
in turn repealed by the Florida Legislature in a statute which also pre-
scribes extensive procedures on the same subjects and adds a bifurcated
trial procedure for trials where insanity is at issue.
The effects of all the amendments are discussed below in order
as indicated by the foregoing Table of Contents.
II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
A. Rule 3.125. Notice To Appear
The notice to appear is a document requiring an accused to appear
*Professor, Florida State University College of Law. B.S. & B.A. 1963, Lehigh Uni-
versity; J.D. 1967, Duquesne University; LL.M. 1968, Yale University.
1. Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1977). The order
adopting the amendments states: "The committee notes appended to each rule are
not adopted by the Court." Id.
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in court on a specified date. It is issued by the arresting officer or by
the booking officer and is in effect a decision by the police to release
an accused on his own recognizance. The use of the notice to appear
is discretionary and applies to misdemeanor and ordinance violations
only. Although the device has existed since July, 1973, it has generated
no litigation.2
An important change in Rule 3.125 is the addition of subsection
(k) which limits defense discovery in prosecutions on notice to appear.3
Subsection (e) requires that the "arresting officer shall file with the
clerk a list of witnesses and their addresses, and a list of tangible
evidence in the cause." Subsection (k) restricts discovery to these items
and like items which later come into the possession or control of the
prosecutor. Discovery normally available to the defense under Rule
3.220(a) and (b) is thus restricted. Furthermore, under Rule 3.220(d),
discovery depositions may not be taken, and under Rule 3.125(k),
witness statements need not be disclosed unless they are construed to
be "tangible evidence." On the other hand, the defense will obtain a
witness list and tangible evidence to be used at trial without incurring
the reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 3.220(b)(3) and (b)(4)
triggered by defense's discovery request under Rule 3.220(a), since no
request by the defense is necessary.
Rule 3.1250) was also amended to shift from the chief law .en-
forcement officer to the chief judge of the circuit the responsibility
for promulgating rules and regulations governing authority to issue
notices to appear. This change in responsibility may result in more
frequent use of the notice to appear. Rule 3.130(1), for instance, con-
templates a summons rather than an arrest warrant where a mis-
demeanor complaint is filed and the defendant has not yet been
arrested, "unless the magistrate or judge has reasonable ground to
believe that the person will not appear in response to a summons .... "
Judicially promulgated rules could require the use of notice to appear
unless the stated criteria-of Rule 3.125(b) are met.4 This would mini-
2. Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 887-88 (M.D. Fla. 1975), is the only decision
referring to FLA. R. RIuM. P. 3.125. The court there noted that the rule could be useful
in alleviating overcrowding in the Duval County jail and that the sheriff had, by rule,
prohibited its use in charges of drunkeness, public affray, unlawful assembly, habitual
offender, and shoplifting.
3. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125(k), Discovery by Defendant, states:
Upon demand of the defendant or his counsel the clerk shall furnish to de-
fendant a copy of that Schedule of Witnesses and Exhibits filed with the Notice
to Appear.
Defendant's right to further discovery in prosecutions by Notice to Appear shall
be limited to names and addresses of witnesses and tangible evidence in possession
or control of the prosecutor which are not contained in that schedule.
4. FLA. R. CiM. P. 3.125(b), By Arresting Officer, states:
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mize the unnecessary jailing of many accused misdemeanants and the
consequent effect of the bond premium as a de facto fine.
A disturbing aspect of the forms for notice to appear appended to
Rule 3.125 is that they apparently vest considerable sentencing dis-
cretion in the arresting officer.5 The officer may check a box stating
the suspect need not appear in court. The suspect may then sign a
waiver form and pay a fine determined by the arresting officer.6 The
regulations issued by the chief judge could possibly restrict or reject
this discretionary sentencing power. It would seem, however, that a
procedure which contemplates actual sentencing by law enforcement
officials, as opposed to sentencing recommendations which occur in
guilty plea negotiations, runs some danger of unconstitutionality. 7
B. Rule 3.130. Pretrial Release
Prior to amendment, Rule 3.130(b)(4) stated that at first appearance,
the judge should determine the necessity for and the amount of bail,
after considering "all available relevant factors." This subsection was
amended to establish a number of specific forms of release in addition
to money bail and recognizance.8 These conditions of release were
If a person is arrested for an offense declared to be a misdemeanor of the
first or second degree or a violation, or is arrested for violation of a municipal
or county ordinance triable in the county, and demand to be taken before a
magistrate is not made, notice to appear may be issued by the arresting officer
unless:
(1) The accused fails or refuses to sufficiently identify himself or
supply the required information;
(2) The accused refuses to sign the notice to appear;
(3) The officer has reason to believe that the continued liberty of
the accused constitutes an unreasonable risk of bodily injury to himself
or others;
(4) The accused has no ties with the jurisdiction reasonably sufficient
to assure his appearance or there is substantial risk that he will refuse to
respond to the notice;
(5) The officer has any suspicion that the accused may be wanted
in any jurisdiction; or
(6) It appears that the accused has previously failed to respond to a
notice or a summons or has violated the conditions of any pretrial release
program.
5. 343 So. 2d at 1249-50.
6. First degree misdemeanors are punishable by a maximum of a year in jail and a
$1000 fine. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(a), .083(l)(d) (1975). By his on-the-street decision to
permit a fine payment, the officer eliminates a substantial incarceration penalty and can
exercise considerable discretion as to the amount of the fine.
7. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). It is well established
that sentencing is a judicial function and that the judge's discretion cannot be cir-
cumscribed or eliminated to produce more expedient procedures. Tilghman v. Culver,
99 So. 2d 282, 286 (Fla. 1957).
8. Rule 3.130(b)(4)(i) defines bail as any of the following forms of release:
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adapted from the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,1 but there are
three important differences:
(1) The Florida rule omits a condition of the Bail Reform Act
providing for deposit with the court of specified securities not exceed-
ing ten percent of the bond amount, "to be returned upon per-
formance of the conditions of release."' 10 The "Committee Note"
appended to the amendment makes no mention of why this condition
was omitted."
(2) The Florida rule also does not state that the conditions may
be cumulatively imposed, whereas the Bail Reform Act specifically
provides for this procedure. 12 The Florida rule simply states that "bail
is defined as any of the following forms of release" and then enumerates
the conditions. The conditions were probably intended to be cumula-
tive if necessary, and the omission of the language contained in the
Bail Reform Act explicitly making them cumulative may have been
an oversight. This inference is strengthened by the inclusion of condi-
tion (6), copied directly from the federal act, permitting the judge to
impose "any other condition deemed reasonably necessary . ". 13This
implies the option of cumulative conditions, but the language was
taken from a statutory provision expressly permitting cumulative condi-
tions.
(3) Finally, the Florida rule does not incorporate a mandate of
the Bail Reform Act that the judge release the accused on recognizance
or on an unsecured appearance bond unless he determines such to be
inadequate, and then to impose only the least restrictive further condi-
tions necessary to guarantee appearance. This omitted provision seems
self-evident and innocuous enough, since to impose restrictions beyond
(1) Personal recognizance of the defendant;
(2) Execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by
the judge;
(3) Placing the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(4) Placing restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
defendant during the period of release;
(5) Requiring the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties,
or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(6) Imposing any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap-
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the defendant return
to custody after specified hours.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970).
10. Id. § 3146(a)(3).
11. 343 So. 2d at 1251.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1970). Under the federal act a magistrate or judge could
thus impose both money bail and restrict the travel and the place of abode of the
defendant.
13. FLA. R. CIM. P. 3.130(b)(4)(i)(6).
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those necessary to guarantee appearance would certainly be an un-
constitutionally excessive bail."' Nevertheless, the omitted provision,
when read with another omitted provision of the federal act requiring
the judge to state in writing his reasons for imposing a condition or
conditions of release where the accused is unable to meet them, 5 pro-
vided a standard (however broad) of judicial review, which the com-
mittee or the supreme court perhaps desired to avoid.'
In Pugh v. Rainwater,7 the court of appeals held that Rule 3.130
(b) (4) violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment since the rule does not require the judge "to consider less
financially onerous forms of release before [imposing] money bail"' 8
and "gives the judge essentially unreviewable discretion to impose
money bail . . ."1. The court stated:
Our holding is not that money bail may never be imposed on an
indigent defendant. The record before us does not justify our telling
the State of Florida that in no case will money bail be necessary
to assure a defendant's appearance. We hold only that equal pro-
tection standards require a presumption against money bail and in
favor of those forms of release which do not condition pretrial free-
dom on an ability to pay.20
The court remanded the case to the district court to fashion the
remedy. Such remedy should at least include written findings by the
trial judge supporting his conclusion that money bail is necessary to
guarantee the presence of the accused and should provide for expedited
appellate review.2' By the terms of the Pugh decision, such procedures
would be required only where the defendant was determined indigent
and money bail was imposed. Under Rule 3.130(b)(4), as amended,
the imposition of other onerous conditions (e.g., a condition that the
14. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) (1970).
16. The 1977 "Committee Note" following Rule 3.130 states: "This proposal leaves
it to the sound discretion of the judge to determine the least onerous form of release
which will still insure the defendant's appearance." 343 So. 2d at 1251.
It is noteworthy that the concept of excessive bail has generally been tied to the
amount necessary to guarantee the presence of the accused, as the "Committee Note"
recognizes. But in Matera v. Buchanan, 192 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), the
court stated bail was excessive when set in "an amount as to preclude the probability
of the accused's being able to furnish it." Id. at 20. See also State ex rel. Bardina v.
Sandstrom, 321 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
17. 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977).
18. Id. at 1201.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1202 (footnote omitted).
21. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(d), 3147 (1970).
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accused return to custody in the evening) would not require written
findings.
A new provision has been added in Rule 3.130(b)(4)(iv), stating
that "[i]nformation stated in, or offered in connection with, any order
entered pursuant to this rule need not strictly conform to the rules
of evidence." This provision may permit the prosecution to use
hearsay evidence to establish the need for high bond, a result pro-
scribed by existing case law. Bail may be denied where the defendant
is charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment,
but only if "the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is
great .... ,22 Primm v. State23 held that the state could not meet this
standard by hearsay evidence. Rodriguez v. State2 4 held that the trial
judge erred in admitting in a bond reduction hearing police testi-
mony as to information received from unnamed confidential in-
formants. The continuing validity of these authorities is thrown into
doubt by the amendment to the rule.
The other important amendment to Rule 3.130 is the elimination
in section (a) of the provision that bail after conviction could be
allowed "in the discretion of" the trial or appellate court. Section (a)
now states: "After conviction bail may be granted by either the trial
or appellate court." The elimination of the discretionary language
was necessary to conform to the changes in Rule 3.691, Post-Trial Re-
lease, which was amended in response to section 903.132 of the Florida
Statutes.
2 5
C. Rule 3.131. Pretrial Probable Cause Determinations
and Adversary Preliminary Hearings
Although there has been no reported litigation in Florida on the
issue, there was a question under the prior rules as to the res judicata
effect of a judicial determination of no probable cause to detain an
arrested person. 6 The issue is particularly troublesome where further
evidence incriminating the suspect is discovered after the probable
cause determination, but it also arises where the prosecution simply
22. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130(a); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
23. 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. James v. State, 241 So. 2d 383
(Fla. 1970) (hearsay admitted at the bail hearing would have been admissible under
the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule).
24. 305 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See Stansel v. State, 297 So. 2d
63 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
25. (Supp. 1976). See note 253 infra and accompanying text.
26. The prevailing view is that a determination of no probable cause does not bar
resubmission of the issue to another magistrate, even where no new evidence is pre-
sented. United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S. 390, 393 (1925); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 334 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1975); Tell v. Wolke, 124 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Wis. 1963).
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seeks to present the same evidence to a different judge. The amend-
ment to Rule 3.131(c) explicitly permits non-adversary redetermina-
tion of the probable cause issue, whether previously determined in an
adversary or non-adversary context, and is not limited to situations
where the prosecution claims newly discovered evidence.2 7 If a felony
offense is charged, and if this second non-adversary hearing results in
a finding of probable cause so that the suspect is retained in or re-
turned to custody, the amendment provides that he is then entitled
to an adversary preliminary hearing.28 It is not clear why the pro-
cedures necessary for testing the legality of pretrial restraint should
depend on the seriousness of the charge. 29 In Pugh v. Rainwater,° the
Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional the provision in a previous rule
providing for adversary preliminary hearings only in felony cases.
This ruling was not disturbed by the Supreme Court's reviewing de-
cision in Pugh.
31
The amended rule also provides that if the state fails to present a
case for probable cause determination within the specified time
periods,32 the suspect shall not be released without notice to the state
and an extension allowed for "a reasonable period of time, not to
27. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(c), Additional Nonadversary Probable Cause Determina-
tions and Preliminary Hearings, provides:
If there has been a finding of no probable cause at a nonadversary determination or
adversary preliminary hearing, or if the specified time periods for holding a non-
adversary probable cause determination have not been complied with, a magis-
trate may thereafter make a determination of probable cause at a nonadversary
probable cause determination, in which event the defendant shall be retained in
custody or returned to custody upon appropriate process issued by the magistrate.
A defendant who has been retained in custody or returned to custody by such
a determination shall be allowed an adversary preliminary hearing in all instances
in which a felony offense is charged.
28. Rule 3.131(b)(1) similarly limits to felony charges the right to an adversary
hearing where an information or indictment has not been filed within 21 days of arrest.
29. The distinction may be based on the expectation that those charged with
misdemeanors will ordinarily be released on small bonds or on their own recognizance.
Rule 3.131(b), providing adversary preliminary hearings where the suspect has not been
formally charged within 21 days of arrest, does not distinguish whether the suspect
has been released. This suggests that the probability of release without restrictions is
not the rationale for failing to provide for adversary preliminary hearings in mis-
demeanor cases, where there has been a redetermination of probable cause in the
nonadversary context. There may be an assumption that redetermination of the probable
cause issue in misdemeanor cases will be extremely rare; however, under those circum-
stances there would be no apparent reasons for not covering the exceptional situation.
30. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
31. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
32. Rule 3.131(a)(1) requires a probable cause determination either before arrest
incident to issuing an arrest warrant or within 72 hours of arrest. The 72-hour period
may be continued an additional 24 hours "for good cause."
1977]
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exceed 24 hours, in which to establish probable cause."'33 Rule 3.131
(a)(1) already provides for a twenty-four hour extension to the seventy-
two hour probable cause time limit "for good cause" shown. Whether
the second twenty-four hour extension would apply where the state
had already obtained an initial "good cause" extension is not specified
by the rule. If the two twenty-four hour periods are considered cumula-
tive, there could conceivably be a five-day delay between arrest and
release for failure to establish probable cause. The effect of the amend-
ment is to eliminate the "good cause" requirement for delay beyond
the seventy-two hour limit. In Gerstein v. Pugh,3 4 the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment requires a probable cause deter-
mination "either before or promptly after arrest.' '35 Whether these
time limits are sufficiently "prompt," particularly in view of the fact
that live testimony need not be presented to the magistrate, is open
to question."
The quality of the hearsay contained in the affidavits supporting
the probable cause determination has been the subject of recent litiga-
tion in Pugh v. Rainwater.3 7 The federal district court held that where
probable cause is based upon hearsay, the affidavit or testimony must
state both the bases on which the witnesses were found to be credible
or their information reliable and the underlying facts indicating an
offense had occurred. The court thus adopted the standards of Aguilar
v. Texas"s and Spinelli v. United States39 regarding probable cause in
the search warrant context."°
33. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(a)(4).
34. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
35. Id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
36. Where delays in the granting of preliminary hearings have been found un-
constitutional, the delays were considerably longer than five days. See, e.g., People v.
Howell, 324 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. 1975) (65 days); People v. Hunt, 326 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. App.
1975) (66 days).
37. 422 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
38. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
39. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
40. The Rainwater court described the deficiencies in affidavits, upon which the
probable cause determinations were made, as follows:
In some cases, the affidavit does not disclose the names of the eyewitnesses to
the offense or indicate from whom the officer received his information. None of
the affidavits disclose any indicia of the credibility of the witness. Some affidavits
are insufficient in that they do not disclose enough of the underlying facts to
allow the magistrate to make his independent determination that an offense has
probably occurred, while others do not sufficiently show that the offense charged
probably occurred.
422 F. Supp. at 501-02 (footnotes omitted).
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D. Rule 3.140. Indictments; Informations
Subsection (a)(2) was amended to provide for prosecutions of mis-
demeanors, municipal ordinances, and county ordinances by Notice to
Appear, as provided by Rule 3.125. 41
E. Rule 3.151. Consolidation of Related Offenses
This rule originated as Rule 1.190(k) of the 1968 Rules. At that
time it provided only that the court could order consolidation of pend-
ing indictments or informations on the motion of the state or the de-
fendant, if the offenses and/or defendants could have been originally
joined in a single charging instrument. The 1972 amendment elimi-
nated the right of the state to move for consolidation.42 At the same
time, it added crucial language which provided that if the defendant
was tried on one of two or more related offenses,' the separate charge
of every other related offense must be dismissed-unless the defendant
previously made a consolidation motion which was denied or unless
he waived his right to consolidation."4 The 1972 amendment also pro-
vided that the defendant's failure to move for consolidation of related
indictments or informations constituted a waiver, but it did not state
that a similar failure to move for consolidation of offenses which had
not yet been filed operated as a waiver.4 5 As a result, Rule 3.151 can
be read to require that the state charge all related offenses at one time,
and that failure to do so bars a subsequent trial if one or more of the
related offenses have been tried.48 Under this interpretation, if the
41. See text accompanying notes 2-7 supra.
42. This was apparently on the theory that the state had the original option to
file a single multi-count charging instrument and, therefore, should be held to its
election to file multiple charging instruments. 1972 Committee Notes (b), 33 FLA. STAT.
ANN. 189-90 (West 1975).
43. "Related offenses" are defined in Rule 3.151(a) as offenses which "are triable
in the same court and are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
connected acts or transactions." It should be noted that a misdemeanor is "triable"
in the same circuit court as a felony if it "aris[es] out of the same circumstances as a
felony which is also charged." FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 20(3).
44. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.151(c).
45. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.151(b).
46. The 1972 amendment to Rule 3.151 was modeled on Standard 1.3 of the A.B.A.
Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance. INST. OF JUDICIAL AD., ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE (1968). The
wording of the A.B.A. Standard is less ambiguous, however, for it clearly states that a
defendant must only move for joinder of offenses for which he knows he has been
charged; subsequent trial on any uncharged related offense would be barred unless
there was insufficient evidence at the time of the first trial to warrant a conviction, or
for some other reason the ends of justice would be defeated. The Commentary to
Standard 1.3 makes clear that the purpose of the standard is to force the state to
prosecute at a single trial all offenses arising from the same criminal episode. Id. at 19.
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state tried the defendant in county court for driving under the in-
fluence of alcoholic beverages and subsequently filed a charge for man-
slaughter based on the same traffic accident, trial on the latter offense
would be barred.
Curiously, there has been no reported litigation regarding this
interpretation of Rule 3.151, and the 1977 amendment simply rein-
corporates the 1968 provision (which had been deleted by the 1972
amendment) allowing the state to move for consolidation.4 7 But the
supreme court in Belote v. State,45 a decision virtually contemporaneous
with the amendment of the rule, has made it extremely dangerous for
the state to do so. In Belote, the defendant had been charged in three
separate informations as follows: (1) possession of more than five grams
and delivery of marijuana on January 26, 1973; (2) possession of more
than five grams of marijuana on January 27, 1973; and (3) delivery
of marijuana on January 27, 1973.4' The three informations were set
for trial on the same day, April 9, 1973. On April 9, the trials were re-
scheduled for April 10; the afternoon of April 9, the trial court on its
own motion consolidated the three informations for a single trial on
April 10. The court mailed a notice of this consolidation to defendant
on April 9, but it was not received until after the trial on April 10.
The defense thus first learned of the consolidation at appearance for
trial on the morning of April 10 and immediately objected to the
consolidation. The defendant was convicted on all charges except the
January 27 delivery charge. The supreme court reversed the convic-
tions, ruling that the consolidation was erroneous. In one part of the
Belote opinion, the court emphasized that Rule 3.151(b), prior to
the 1977 amendment, limited consolidation to motions by the de-
fendant, and thus the trial court was not authorized to consolidate
the charges without the consent of the defendant. As an independent
basis for its decision, however, the court relied heavily on Kilgore v.
State.50 The Kilgore trial court on its own motion and over defense
objection consolidated separate informations for second-degree murder
and carrying a concealed weapon. The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the convictions. The supreme court in Belote discussed the
Kilgore decision as follows:
Such an interpretation of Rule 3.151 would thus confer upon the defendant the benefit
of the "same transaction" test for double jeopardy discussed by Mr. Justice Brennan in
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (concurring opinion). Florida case law has
consistently followed the much narrower "same evidence" test. See State v. Bowden, 18
So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1944); State v. Shaw, 219 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App, 1969).
47. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.151(b).
48. 344 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1977).
49. Id. at 566.
,50, 271 -So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2dDist, Ct. App. 1972).
FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The District Court found possible prejudice to the defendant as
a result of consolidation in that he might be forced to testify in
his own behalf on one charge, thereby subjecting himself to cross-
examination on all charges, and in that he might receive fewer per-
emptory challenges than in separate trials. The District Court found
these to be cogent and compelling reasons inveighing against con-
solidation over the defendant's objection.
The facts in the instant case and in Kilgore are practically
identical. The fact that Kilgore involved a murder charge is im-
material to our consideration. Petitioner was denied substantial
procedural rights by consolidation over her objection on such short
notice.51
The denial of the procedural rights relating to exposing the de-
fendant to cross-examination on all charges and reducing the number
of peremptory challenges rendered the consolidation in Kilgore and
Belote reversible error. These rights would be denied in any case
where consolidation has been ordered without the defendant's consent
and where multiple charges have originally been joined in a single
charging instrument.52 The fact that the consolidation was "on short
notice" in Belote should not be a distinguishing factor for two reasons.
First, the defendant was already on notice that all three charges were
set for trial the same day, April 10, and therefore should have been
prepared for trial on all three charges. 53 More importantly, the "pro-
cedural rights" which were lost by the consolidation would be lost
regardless of how much notice the defendant had of the consolida-
tion. Hence, although Rule 3.151 now provides for consolidation of
related offenses on a motion by the state, it seems an extremely
dangerous course to follow since consolidation will involve the
probable loss of those "procedural rights" protected in Belote.5
4
III. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEAS
A. Rule 3.171. Plea Discussion and Agreements
The amendment to Rule 3.171 is an almost complete revision
51. 344 So. 2d at 566-67 (emphasis added).
52. The Kilgore and Belote decisions are thus helpful to a defendant seeking
severance under Rule 3.152(a)(2)(i).
53. The Belote decision does not suggest that as a result of the consolidation, the
defendant was prejudiced in preparation of the case.
54. The trial court could arguably avoid the Belote problem by granting the de-
fendant additional peremptory challenges and strictly limiting cross-examination of
the defendant to the offense or offenses on which the defendant testified. The defendant
would nevertheless still be prejudiced by his silence on the other charges. See, e.g., Cross
v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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of the prior rule. Like its predecessor, the amended rule encourages
the prosecutor and defense attorney "to discuss and to agree on pleas
which may be entered by a defendant," 55 but the amendment specifies
in more detail the obligations of the prosecutor and defense attorney
in plea bargaining.5 8
Section (b), which states the responsibilities of the prosecuting
attorney in plea bargaining, is divided into a permissive subsection,
(b) (1), and a mandatory subsection, (b)(2). Paragraph (b)(1)(i) out-
lines the various ways in which the prosecutor may plea bargain, i.e.,
by dropping other charges, by making nonbinding sentencing recom-
mendations, and by agreeing to a specific sentence (which if not con-
curred in by the trial judge would permit the defendant to withdraw
his plea under Rule 3.172(g)). Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) specifies that the
prosecutor may "[c]onsult with the victim, investigating officer or
other interested persons and advise the trial judge of their views
during the course of plea discussions." Although this paragraph! is
cast in permissive terms, the Committee Note on this provision states:
"The rule sets out discretionary minimum professional prosecutorial
procedure where either victim or law enforcement officers are involved
better to guide the trial judge. '" 57 If the specified consultation was in-
deed viewed as the "minimum professional prosecutorial procedure,"
then such consultation should not be "discretionary." The inconsistency
here undoubtedly reflects uncertainty regarding the extent to which
the judge should interfere with prosecutorial discretion in plea bar-
gaining. If consultation were mandatory, the judge would then be-
55. Rule 3.171(a). Cf. Standard 3.1, Abolition of Plea Negotiation, in NAT'L ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS (1973) (recommending the
abolition of plea bargaining by 1978).
56. Subsection (c) of the prior rule dealt with the responsibilities of the trial
judge. This has been transferred almost intact to subsection (d) and provides, as
before, that the trial judge may have made known to him the terms of the plea agree-
ment and that "[tjhereafter, he shall advise the parties of whether other factors (unknown
at the time) may make his concurrence impossible." Subsection (d) does not now pro-
vide (as did former subsection (c)) that the plea agreement be placed in the record
and that the defendant may withdraw his plea should ultimate judicial concurrence be
impossible. However, these provisions are now included in Rule 3.172, Acceptance of
Guilty or Nolo Contendere Plea. Since subsection (d) has retained the permissive language
of previous subsection (c), viz., "the trial judge may have made known to him the agree-
ment" (emphasis added), it seems clear that the judge could refuse at the outset to
entertain any plea negotiations regarding sentence and insist that the defendant plead
not guilty or guilty as charged.
Subsection (d) of the prior rule provided: "If the defendant pleads not guilty, no
mention of any prior proceedings hereunder shall be admissible against him." This
has been eliminated from amended Rule 3.171. This subject is now covered in Rule
3.172(h), and the wording has been completely changed.
57. 343 So. 2d at 1254. The committee notes were not adopted by the Court. Id.
at 1247.
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come aware in certain cases of the unacceptability of the bargain to
the police or the victim. Although the rule is permissive, many judges
may insist on such consultations before concurring in a sentence,
particularly since it is the "minimum professional prosecutorial pro-
cedure."
Paragraph (b)(2)(i) is mandatory and requires the prosecution to
"[a]pprise the trial judge of all material facts known to him regarding
the offense and the defendant's background prior to acceptance of a
plea by the trial judge . . . ." Rule 3.172(a),58 requires the trial judge to
determine "that the plea is voluntarily entered and that there is a
factual basis for it." The first part of paragraph 3.171 (b)(2) (i) facilitates
the judge's factual basis determination by requiring the prosecutor
to supply the material facts of the offense. It is probably true, however,
that if both the prosecutor and judge fail to discharge their responsi-
bilities, the defendant will not be able to subsequently vacate his plea
solely because the record demonstrates that the prosecutor did not
apprise the trial judge of the material facts and the judge did not
determine the factual basis from some other source. 9
58. Discussed infra text accompanying notes 62-108.
59. In Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975), the supreme court held that a
defendant was not entitled to vacate a guilty plea where the record contained no
factual basis determination, unless the defendant could prove that a "manifest in-
justice" had occurred. Id. at 375. The Williams court saw no manifest injustice, however,
finding that the defendant was represented by competent counsel and the plea was
entered voluntarily with an understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea.
(The plea bargain was honored by the trial judge.) A question left open by the Williams
decision is whether a clear demonstration by defendant that there was in fact no
factual basis for the plea would be a sufficient demonstration of "manifest injustice,"
even though the defendant and his counsel were cognizant of this at the time the plea
was entered.
Consider, for example, the situation where the defendant pleads guilty to possession
of less than five grams of marijuana, although the lab report specifies that the mari-
juana seized from defendant consisted of more than five grams. Under existing decisions,
possession of less than five grams could not be a lesser included offense of the more
serious charge. Gilford v. State, 313 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975). (In Gilford, defendants were
charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. The only proof
at trial was that over $600 worth of liquor was stolen from the premises. The court held
that the $600 alone gave no evidence of petit larceny theft of less than $100, and hence
breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny was not a lesser included offense.)
Arguably, therefore, no factual basis exists for a plea to the lesser charge of possession
of less than five grams. If the defendant is placed on probation pursuant to his guilty
plea to possession of less than five grams, and then subsequently violates probation, he
could argue that his original guilty plea was invalid for lack of a factual basis.
It is unfair, of course, to permit a defendant to escape the consequences of a guilty
plea for which he originally bargained. On the other hand, the public arguably has
an interest in the penal laws being enforced as contemplated by the legislature. If, as
some contend, the five gram amount for marijuana is an unrealistically low weight to
separate the misdemeanor from the felony possession charge, this certainly would
become more evident if the legislative intent were enforced. An effective check on this
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The second part of paragraph (b)(2)(i) requires the prosecution
to apprise the judge of the material facts of the defendant's back-
ground. In the usual case the prosecution will have little information
in this regard other than the defendant's "rap sheet." This prosecu-
torial obligation will have significance only in those situations where
the trial judge does not intend to order a presentence investigation,
e.g., where the judge already has significant information concerning
the defendant.60
Section (c) of amended Rule 3.171 expands the obligations of
defense counsel in plea negotiations as previously covered in Rule
3.171(b). The prior rule provided that defense counsel should advise
his client on all pertinent matters regarding which plea to enter; the
amendment adds the requirement that defense counsel advise de-
fendant of all plea offers.6' It is difficult to imagine the appropriate
redress for a defendant, however, were he not informed of all plea
offers. Once the prosecution withdraws a particular offer, the de-
fendant should not be able to reactivate it because of defense counsel's
dereliction.
B. Rule 3.172. Acceptance of Guilty or
Nolo Contendere Plea
This rule is a new one and has no analogous provision in the prior
rules. It states in detail the obligations of the trial judge in accepting
a guilty or nolo plea and specifies some collateral consequences of the
plea.
Section (a) states: "Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere the trial judge shall satisfy himself that the plea is voluntarily
entered and that there is a factual basis for it." This is perhaps an
unintended departure from Rule 3.170(j), 62 which requires the judge
abuse of prosecutorial discretion (plea-bargaining to lower the charge to a misdemeanor)
would be to invalidate guilty pleas to offenses for which there is no proof. Williams,
however, specified that the purpose of the factual basis requirement was "to avoid a
defendant's mistakenly entering a plea of guilty to the wrong offense." 316 So. 2d at 272.
The mandate of Rule 3.171(b)(2)(i), that the prosecutor apprise the judge of the
material facts, arguably serves to protect the public's interest that the penal laws be
appropriately enforced and, to this extent, the rationale of Williams is modified. This
argument is strengthened by the fact that Rule 3.172(a) now requires a factual basis
for both a guilty and a nolo plea, whereas rule 3.1700) permits a nolo plea without a
factual basis. See discussion of Rule 3.172, text accompanying notes 62-108 infra.
60. The Committee Note for subparagraph (b)(2)(i) states: "Mandatory responsibility
of prosecutor contemplates disposition with no presentence investigation." 343 So. 2d at
1254.
61. FLA. R. Clum. P. 3.171(c)(2)(i).
62. The new Rule 3.172 greatly expands upon the courts obligations-previously
covered in Rule 3.170(j)-in accepting a plea, but Rule 3.1700) was not repealed.
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to determine "that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty" and
thus permits a nolo plea without a factual basis. 63 Under this rule, for
example, a defendant might plead nolo contendere to the offense of
attempted bribery, although there could be no factual basis for such
a crime since attempted bribery is bribery as the offense is defined by
section 838.015(1) of the Florida Statutes.64 The requirement that
there be a factual basis for nolo pleas is perhaps a recognition that
defendants should be able to plead only to those offenses which under
the evidence, they could have in fact committed. 65
Section (c) enumerates in seven subsections the trial judge's
obligations in questioning the defendant regarding the voluntariness
and his understanding of the plea. Subsection (ii) concerns defendant's
understanding of his right to counsel (if he is unrepresented); 66 sub-
section (iii) clarifies defendant's procedural rights should he plead
not guilty and go to trial;6 7 and subsection (v) speaks to the defendant's
waiver of those rights by pleading guilty.6
Subsection (c)(i) requires the judge to determine that the defendant
understands "[t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered,
the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law." 69 This subsection should
63. FED. R. C5IM. P. 11(f) also imposes the factual basis requirement only for
guilty pleas.
64. (1975).
65. See note 59 supra.
66. Rule 3.172(c)(ii) states in relevant part:
(c) Except where a defendant is not present for a plea, pursuant to the pro-
visions of Rule 3.180(c), the trial judge should, when determining voluntariness, place
the defendant under oath and shall address the defendant personally and shall
determine that he understands the following:
(ii) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right
to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and,
if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him ....
67. Rule 3.172(c)(iii) requires the judge to determine whether the defendant under-
stands:
That he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has
already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that
trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to compel attendance
of witnesses on his behalf, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
68. Rule 3.172(c)(v) requires a determination of whether defendant understands
"[t[hat if he pleads guilty or is adjudged guilty after a plea of nolo contendere there
will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere
he waives the right to a trial." This inquiry would establish the validity of the waiver
of defendant's constitutional rights and privileges as required by Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969).
69. This language is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) and is considerably more
precise than Rule 3.170(j), the general statement of the court's responsibility on pleas,
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be read in conjunction with subsection (c) (vii), which requires the
judge to determine that the defendant understands the terms of the
plea agreement.70 This will generally be more important than the
maximum penalty authorized by law. The trial judge's obligations re-
garding the defendant's understanding of the sentencing consequences
of the plea are, therefore, relatively straightforward. If, for instance, a
defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a firearm 1 and
negotiated a plea agreement that the maximum sentence he could
receive would be four years, the trial judge should ascertain if the
defendant understands that the mandatory minimum sentence is three
years;72 that the maximum sentence authorized by law is five years;
but that, under the terms of the plea agreement, the maximum
sentence he may receive is four years in prison.73
The trial judge's obligation to determine that the defendant under-
stands the "nature of the charge" is somewhat more complex. In
Williams v. State, the supreme court explained the language of rule
3.170(j), the general statement of the court's responsibility regarding
pleas, by saying that "a defendant must understand the nature of the
charge and the consequences of his plea. The purpose of this require-
ment is to ensure that he knows what particular act he has committed,
which requires only that the judge determine that "the circumstances . . . reflect a full
understanding of the significance of the plea .... "
70. Rule 3.172(c)(vii) requires a determination that defendant understands "[t]he
complete terms of any plea agreement, including specifically all obligations the defendant
will incur as a result."
71. FLA. STAT. § 784.021 (1975).
72. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2)(a) (1976 Supp.).
73. If a defendant pleads guilty to more than one count, he should be informed
that consecutive sentencing is possible. The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that
failure to so inform is not grounds for vacating the plea. Johnson v. United States, 460
F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1972).
In Baker v. State, 344 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the defendant
entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain. The trial judge did not inform the
defendant of the maximum possible sentence prior to entering the plea. Although the
rules-prior to the creation of Rule 3.172 by the 1977 amendment-did not specifically
require the trial judge to so inform the defendant, the court recognized that language
in Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975) could be construed as requiring it. The
court characterized this language as dictum, however, and ruled that the failure would
be ground to vacate the plea only if the defendant could demonstrate prejudice. The
court stated "[njo prejudice is shown by the record presented to us. In fact, it appears
that defendant received less than the maximum sentence. What difference would it
have made if he had known what the maximum sentence was?" 344 So. 2d at 598.
Although this is true, the record arguably should show that the defendant was aware
of the maximum possible sentence contemplated by the plea bargain.
In Norris v. State, 343 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court held the
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Rule 3.850 where the record
did not show that she was aware of the mandatory three-year minimum sentence re-
garding her plea to aggravated assault with a firearm.
FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
what law he has violated . . . ."7 This undoubtedly involves more
than simply reading to the defendant the statutory language of the
offense to which he is pleading. In Henderson v. Morgan,75 the United
States Supreme Court found a plea to second degree murder in-
voluntary as a matter of constitutional law where there was no showing
the defendant understood the difference in mens rea between second
degree murder and manslaughter.7 6 In Thacker v. State, 7 the court
vacated a guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon where the
record showed some confusion by the defendant as to whether he
could legally possess a firearm in the trunk of his car if he did not
know it was there. It seems clear, therefore, that prior to accepting the
plea, the trial judge will have to explain the essential elements of
the offense, and probably the elements of any defenses suggested by
the facts, in language which the defendant can comprehend. Addi-
tionally, Rule 3.172(d) states that the defendant must either ac-
knowledge his guilt or acknowledge that he believes "the plea to be
in his best interest, while maintaining his innocence." The validity of
the acknowledgment will depend on the defendant's understanding of
the offense.
It is clear that the trial judge cannot adequately discharge his
responsibilities regarding the defendant's understanding of the nature
of the charge and subsequent acknowledgment of guilt or best interest,
unless the trial judge has a complete understanding of the facts
supporting the charge. Thus, the requirement of 3.172(a) that "[b]efore
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the trial judge shall
satisfy himself that the plea is voluntarily entered and that there is a
factual basis for it" is inextricably related to the other judicial obliga-
tions in the rule. If the trial judge is not familiar with the facts, he
cannot have adequately explained the nature of the charge to the
defendant and, therefore, the defendant's acknowledgment of guilt
cannot be an understanding one. This view of the interrelationship
of factual basis, the nature of the charge, and the defendant's ac-
knowledgment of guilt assumes that a central purpose of Rule 3.172
74. 316 So. 2d at 271. See note 69 supra.
75. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
76. See Monroe v. United States, 463 F.2d 1032 (5th -Cir. 1972), for a similar
decision involving the difference between second degree murder and manslaughter. The
court vacated the plea, stating: "[A] routine boilerplate question to the defendant as
to whether he understands the charges is not sufficient, and a single response by the
defendant that he 'understands' the charge 'gives no assurance or basis for believing
he does.'" Id. at 1035. The defendant in Monroe was "'borderline mentally deficient'
with a mental age of 12 and unable to read...." Id. The court did not discuss the
terms in which the difference in mens rea should have been explained.
77. 313 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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is to judicially monitor the relationship and discussions between the
defendant and his counsel leading to the decision to plead guilty. In
many instances, the interest of both the prosecutor and defense counsel
is to produce a guilty plea. All of the considerations bearing on the
wisdom of a guilty plea may not, therefore, have been explained in
an understandable way to the defendant.
The judge, as a reasonably disinterested observer, can guarantee
that the decision to plead guilty is made by a fully informed de-
fendant, but this can only be done with tolerable certainty before the
plea is entered and accepted by the judge. A post-conviction hearing
under Rule 3.850 is a poor substitute. At that time, the defendant
has decided the plea was unwise and therefore is motivated to recall
the events in a light most favorable to vacating the plea. The defense
attorney also will be reluctant to admit that he failed to fully inform
his client regarding the consequences of the plea or that his client
could have misinterpreted some of his advice. Since (1) the judicial
obligations under the rule are clearly specified, (2) the defendant is
seeking only a trial and not complete discharge, and (3) the post-
conviction is a poor one in which to resolve the disputed issues, then
arguably judicial failure to monitor the defendant-counsel relation-
ship should be prejudicial per se. If this function is important enough
to require mandatory judicial obligations under the rule, it should
arguably be enforced by a reversal for failure to perform those obliga-
tions.
It is undoubtedly in this critical area (involving the interrelation-
ship of the judge's determination, the defendant's understanding, and
the validity of the defendant's acknowledgment) that the validity of
guilty pleas will be most contested. Rule 3.172(i) states: "Failure to
follow any of the procedures in this Rule shall not render a plea void
absent a showing of prejudice." What will constitute a "showing of
prejudice" is, of course, the critical question. In Williams v. State ,7
the Florida Supreme Court held that a failure to ascertain factual basis
was not ground for vacating a guilty plea absent a "showing of preju-
dice or manifest injustice," but conditioned this holding by limiting
it to situations "where the record clearly reflects the voluntariness of
the plea and the fact that the defendant understood the nature and
consequences of his plea agreement . . . ."79 It would seem that if these
conditions were met, prejudice or manifest injustice would be extremely
difficult to establish. If the defendant demonstrably understood the
elements necessary to prove the state's case, the strength of the evidence
78. 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975).
79. Id. at 275.
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against him, the available defenses, and the sentencing consequences
of the plea, and then intelligently elected to plead guilty, the judge's
failure to determine factual basis in the record would be an insignificant
technicality. The Williams court observed that the purpose of the
factual basis requirement was "to avoid a defendant's mistakenly enter-
ing a plea of guilty to the wrong offense."80 But a defendant would not
mistakenly plead guilty to the wrong offense if he understood the nature
of the charge.8 On the other hand, a defendant (who presumably
knows what he in fact did) might intentionally plead guilty to an offense
with elements not encompassed by the facts, where the offense is less
serious than the one he in fact committed. But apparently it is not the
function of the factual basis requirement to prevent this. 2
It is significant that Rule 3.172(a) does not require the trial judge
to determine that the defendant understands the factual basis for the
plea, but rather that there is a factual basis. Arguably, then, the rule
contemplates that the trial judge's understanding of the factual basis
will enable him to determine whether the defendant understands the
nature of the charge and therefore is able to competently acknowledge
his guilt or best interest as required by Rule 3.172(d). The Williams
court stated, however, that if a plea is otherwise competently entered,
failure to ascertain factual basis is not grounds for vacating a guilty
plea absent a showing of prejudice. But if the foregoing interpretation
of the rule is correct, the Williams court posits an imaginary state of
affairs, for the competence of the plea depends on the ascertainment
of the factual basis. Put another way, if a defendant mistakenly entered
a plea to the wrong offense, he manifestly had no understanding of
the nature of the charge. If the trial judge cannot ascertain that the
defendant has intelligently entered his plea with a knowledge of the
law as it pertains to the facts without first ascertaining a factual basis,
then it would be impossible to have an otherwise competent plea with-
out a judicial determination of factual basis.
Since this patently was not the view of the Williams court, an
alternative explanation must be sought. The most probable underlying
premise of the Williams decision was that a defendant with counsel
knows what he is doing, and judicial supervision of the wisdom of the
guilty plea is not required. Viewed in this way, the holding in Williams
makes some sense. The failure to ascertain factual basis does make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the judge to insure the defendant truly
understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of his
80. Id. at 272.
81. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
82. See note 59 supra.
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plea. But there is a presumption that his attorney has made this clear
to him. "[P]rejudice with manifest injustice" could be demonstrated if
the defendant showed that he did not fully understand the law as it
related to the facts of his case and was pressured into an ill-considered
decision to plead guilty by his attorney.8 3 Although ideally the trial
judge should inquire into this matter, the cost of vacating all guilty
pleas where he failed to do so is not worth the possible benefits, since-
the perception is-most pleas are in the best interest of the defendant
when entered. This perception is evident in the court's discussion of
Williams' guilty plea and his failure to show prejudice:
Applying this Standard to the appellant-Williams, we find that the
record in the instant case shows no manifest injustice. The appellant
had been convicted by a jury of one offense of selling heroin and was
entering a negotiated plea on five separate major drug offenses. The
transcript reflects his primary interest was the duration of his sen-
tence. In accordance with [ABA] Standard 2.1, (a) he had the effec-
tive assistance of counsel; (b) the guilty plea was entered by himself
personally; (c) the plea was entered voluntarily with knowledge of
the charge and the sentence that could be imposed; and (d) he
received a proper sentence as contemplated by the plea agreement
that he and his counsel negotiated with the State.8 4
This reading of the Williams decision is supported by the decision
in State v. Lyles,8 5 one of a number of companion decisions to Williams
and the only one in which the court found the possibility of prejudice.8 6
In Lyles, the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery. At his sentencing,
he protested that he was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana
at the time of the offense. The supreme court stated:
The factual circumstances of this case are very similar to those
in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed. 2d
418 (1969). When such circumstances are present, the trial judge
83. Thus, in footnote 7 of the Williams decision, the court distinguishedt two
decisions: "Costello v. State, 260 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1972), and Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d
41 (Fla. 1971), are not controlling. In each of these instances the defendant established to
the satisfaction of the majority that he had been prejudiced by an honest misunder-
standing, which contaminated the voluntariness of the plea."
84. 316 So. 2d at 274. The court noted that defendant had "knowledge of the
charge." This is undoubtedly true in that he knew what offense he was pleading guilty
to. But as Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), makes clear, an understanding of
the nature of the charge involves more than this.
85. 316 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1975).
86. The court found no prejudice to the defendant although the trial judge had
not ascertained factual basis in Grant v. State, 316 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1975); Pirtle v. State,
316 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1975); Estes v. State, 316 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1975); and Hall v.
State, 316 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1975).
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should make a searching inquiry to determine whether the defendant
understands that the plea waives any asserted defense. While we do
not agree with the District Court that the plea should be vacated, the
statements made by the defendant, coupled with the trial judge's
failure to ascertain the factual basis for the plea, is sufficient to re-
quire further inquiry by the trial court. We are not vacating the
plea at this time as was done in McCarthy v. United States, supra.
We direct the District Court to remand this cause to the trial
court for the following purposes: (a) to make inquiry of the de-
fendant and his counsel concerning their discussions relative to
the defenses to the charge; (b) to receive evidence of a factual basis
for the plea; and (c) to allow the defendant an opportunity to
present evidence on his own behalf to show how, if at all, manifest
injustice occurred.8 7
This excerpt from Lyles shows the court was primarily concerned
with the discussions between the defendant and his counsel regarding
a possible defense to the charge and not with the possibility that de-
fendant had mistakenly pleaded to the wrong offense.
The Lyles decision indicates that where the record contains no
objections or protestations by the defendant, the court will presume
that counsel adequately explained the elements of the offense and
available defenses related to the facts. In Estes v. State,"" also a com-
panion decision to Williams, the court found no prejudice, but added,
"We do not agree, however, with the holding of the District Court
that 'the factual basis clause . . . is inapplicable in cases where the
guilty plea is the result of plea bargaining.' The fact that the plea is.
negotiated does not eliminate the 'factual basis' requirement from
the rule."89 The First District Court of Appeal had thus made conclu-
sive the presumption that defense counsel had fulfilled the judicial ob-
ligations; the supreme court viewed it as rebuttable. The difficulty with
making the presumption rebuttable is that there is no accurate way of
ascertaining after the fact what the defendant's understanding was at
the time he entered his plea. It would probably not be disputed that
some defense attorneys allow their own interests in avoiding trial to
interfere with an objective assessment of the merits of a guilty plea.
The basic purpose of the detailed judicial inquiries required by Rule
3.172 is to guarantee that the defendant make his own decision with
a full understanding of the relevant considerations. If this is not
guaranteed-and the contention is that it cannot be unless the judge
87. 316 So. 2d at 278-79.
88. 316 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1975).
89. Id. at 277.
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first informs himself as to the facts-and the defendant pleads guilty,
his state of mind cannot thereafter be accurately determined. If the
defendant has second thoughts as to the wisdom of the bargain, he can
only get a second chance by claiming deficient understanding. The
defense attorney is normally the only other witness with relevant testi-
mony, and if he did exert some pressure on the defendant to plead
guilty, or failed to explain the law as it related to the facts, he is un-
likely to so testify at a post-conviction hearing. The court is thus con-
fronted with an irreconcilable conflict between two biased witnesses.
In sum, although the Florida Supreme Court considers the pre-
sumption that defense counsel performed the judicial functions of
Rule 3.172 rebuttable, there appears to be no reliable way to rebut
the presumption. In Lyles, the court remanded the case to the trial
court to investigate the relationship between defendant and counsel
solely because the defendant had protested that he was under the
influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time of the offense. In the
other cases decided the same day, where the court affirmed the convic-
tions based on guilty pleas without a factual basis inquiry, the de-
fendants made no such protestation. There is, however, no necessary
relation between a defendant's protestations to the trial judge and a
failure to understand the nature of the charge. A defendant may
simply be one who could never admit guilt to an authority figure, or
he may be cajoled or coerced by his defense attorney to remain
silent when the plea is entered and at sentencing. The First District
Court of Appeal's approach in Estes-establishing a conclusive presump-
tion that counsel had fulfilled the judicial obligations-has at least the
merit of consistency, whereas the qualified nature of Williams may
produce aleatory results.
Rule 3.172, if it is interpreted similarly to the Williams decision,
will thus embody a schizoid approach to guilty pleas. On the one
hand, the rule sets forth a detailed litany to ensure the competence
of the guilty plea. This recognizes the importance of investigating a
defendant's understanding of the situation at a time when it can be
determined with reasonable accuracy. On the other hand, subsection
3.172(i) requires a showing of prejudice before sanctions for failure to
follow Rule 3.172 are invoked. This implies a belief that the litany is
unimportant in most cases because defense counsel voluntarily follow
it. And it assumes that prejudicial cases can be discerned after the
fact.
It may be persuasively argued that, given the detailed nature of
Rule 3.172 and the difficulty of remedying judicial error, a failure
to adequately establish a defendant's understanding of the nature of
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the charge (which of necessity requires a judicial understanding of
factual basis) and of the penalties provided by law and contemplated
by the plea bargain, introduces a fatal defect into the defendant's
acknowledgment of guilt or self-interest required by 3.172(d).90 The
defendant cannot acknowledge guilt without an understanding of the
elements of the offense and possible defenses, and likewise he cannot
make an informed decision that the plea is in his best interest if the
probability of conviction cannot be assessed. Arguably, a plea entered
without such an acknowledgment is prejudicial per se. The language
of 3.172(d) is significant, insisting that the trial judge "must" deter-
mine that the defendant acknowledges guilt or that the plea is in
his best interest, whereas the arguably less obligatory word "shall" is
used elsewhere in the rule.
Whatever the situation regarding the invalidity of guilty pleas
where Rule 3.172 has not been followed, subsection 3.172(c)(iv) de-
prives the defendant pleading guilty or nolo contendere (without
express reservation of the right to appeal) of his right to appeal "all
matters relating to the judgment, including the issue of guilt or in-
nocence" and limits the defendant to "review by appropriate col-
lateral attack." By its terms this statement includes attacks on the
validity of the guilty plea itself. On the other hand, presumably the
guilty plea would have to be an otherwise valid one to trigger the
waiver. An interpretation that allows only collateral attacks on a guilty
plea will result in longer delays before the validity of a plea is re-
solved on the appellate level, and the indigent defendant will be
initially deprived of representation by the public defender in attacking
the plea. It will also, in many cases, put the defendant in the difficult
position of litigating the effect of a judicial failure to follow Rule
3.172 before the judge who made the error.
It is also questionable whether 3.172(c)(iv) can deprive the de-
fendant of the right to directly appeal fundamental error or error
which could be classified as jurisdictional. It is well established that
a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, whether raised on
appeal or on collateral attack.91 Non-jurisdictional issues may be pre-
served by pleading nolo contendere with leave of the trial court to
appeal.9 2 But jurisdictional defects have been successfully raised on
appeal after an unqualified guilty plea.93 Since non-jurisdictional defects
90. This is one of the new provisions added by the amendment; the effect of a failure
to obtain a competent acknowledgment on the record has not been addressed by prior
decisions.
91. See, e.g., Browning v. State, 307 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
92. Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1973); State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
93. See Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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are categorically waived by a valid guilty plea, i.e., they may not be
raised in any procedural context, Rule 3.172(c)(iv) must have been
intended to apply to jurisdictional defects.94 But there is little sense
in forcing the defendant who has filed and argued a motion to dismiss
the charge because it is based on an unconstitutional statute9 5 to re-
argue the same issue before the same trial judge before obtaining
appellate review. The defendant could obtain immediate appellate
review by pleading nolo contendere and obtaining discretionary leave
of the trial judge to appeal.96 The constitutionality of a statute, how-
ever, is one of the jurisdictional issues that has not previously required
judicial permission to avoid the waiver effect of a guilty or nolo plea.9 7
No good reason appears for requiring jurisdictional issues, which
generally do not generate factual inquiry, to be presented to the trial
court in the first instance, particularly where the issue has already been
passed upon by a ruling on a pretrial motion. The defendant, on the
other hand, suffers delay in having the issue decided at the appellate
level and loses the right to state-appointed counsel on appeal from
the trial judge's ruling on the Rule 3.850 motion. 8
If these criticisms are valid, then Rule 3.172(c)(iv) will effect no
change in present practice. It may not bar direct appeal on the validity
of the plea itself since a valid plea would seem a prerequisite to waiver,
and no apparent purpose is served by applying the rule to jurisdictional
issues. This leaves non-jurisdictional issues which, under present law,
are waived in all contexts-both appellate and collateral proceedings-
by a valid guilty plea.9
94. An alternative explanation is that the drafters intended the rule to apply only
to attacks on the validity of the plea itself and did not consider its application to
jurisdictional defects.
95. This is considered a jurisdictional defect not waived by a guilty plea. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972).
96. It was made clear in Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1973), that the acceptance
of a nolo contendere plea was discretionary with the trial court.
97. Other issues clearly in this category are the statute of limitations, Mitchell v.
State, 25 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1946), and the failure of the charging instrument to allege
an offense under Florida law, Gibbs v. Mayo, 81 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1955). Additionally,
there is authority that double jeopardy is not waived by a guilty plea for purposes of
federal habeas corpus review. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Cf. Robinson v.
State, 239 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (double jeopardy was waived by a
guilty plea where defendant had also failed to raise the issue by motion to dismiss
prior to pleading).
98.. See Ross v. Mofflitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Cox v. State, 320 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); [1975] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN.
REP. 177; [1963-64] FLA. Arr'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 361.
99. The Committee Note to Rule 3.172(c)(iv) does not speak to these criticisms. It
states:
(iv) This waiver of right to appeal is a change from the proposed amend-
ments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure now pending. A sentence if lawful is not
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subject to appellate review; a judgment, however, is. The Committee was of the
opinion that the proposed rule should be expanded to include a waiver of appeal
from the judgment as well as the sentence. Waivers of appeal have been approved,
State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499, 348 A.2d 769 (1975); United States Ex Rel. Amuso v.
LaValle, 291 F. Supp. 383, aff'd 427 F.2d 328 (1970); People v. Williams, 36 N.Y.2d
829, 331 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).
None of the decisions cited in the Committee Note deal with a procedural provision
requiring the waiver of appellate rights as a condition for all guilty pleas.
In State v. Gibson, 348 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1975), the defendant had waived his right
to appeal an armed robbery conviction as part of a plea bargain on another pending
charge. The court ruled that the defendant should be permitted to appeal the con-
viction notwithstanding the provisions of the plea bargain, but that the favorable
provisions of the bargain would then be inoperative.
In United States ex rel. Amuso v. LaVallee, 291 F. Supp. 383 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd
427 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1970), the prosecution agreed to the dismissal of a pending indict-
ment in return for defendant's guilty plea to a charge in another indictment. The trial
court was concerned that defendant might subsequently withdraw his guilty plea or have
it vacated on appeal and did not want to dismiss the pending indictment until it was
certain the guilty plea would endure. If it did not, reinstitution of the status quo ante
would require reindictment. The court thus ordered that it would not dismiss the
pending indictment until the time for appeal from the guilty plea had expired. The
defendant sought federal habeas corpus claiming his guilty plea was subject to an invalid
condition. The federal district court denied the petition emphasizing that conditioning
the plea on the denial of appellate rights was the only way to avoid the possibility of a
one-sided bargain. In affirming the district court, the court of appeals observed:
Moreover, as the transcript of the state trial judge's interrogation of Amuso, pre-
ceding the change of plea, makes clear, the acceptance of his plea of guilty to
the reduced charge was not conditioned on a waiver of his right to appeal. He
still could have appealed within the thirty days, but, had he done so, the
separate indictment against him would not have been dismissed.
427 F.2d at 329.
In People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1975), defendant, who had been charged
with two counts of murder, pleaded guilty to two counts of manslaughter pursuant to
plea negotiations. A condition of the plea was that defendant would not appeal an
adverse ruling on his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. That procedure, permitted
by New York law, would automatically be foreclosed by a guilty plea in Florida without
any express waiver.
At the most, these decisions stand for the proposition that a defendant may waive
his right to appeal pursuant to a plea bargain, but that he may nevertheless appeal
should he be willing to forego the bargain. They most certainly do not stand for the
proposition that the law may limit the right of appeal only to those cases where the
defendant is convicted after trial. On the other hand, there is authority that the state
may not extract a waiver of appeal as a condition of a plea bargain. People v. Butler,
204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). See also State v. Gibson, 348 A.2d 769 (N.J.
1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
If the waiver provision is held to bar appeals attacking the validity of the guilty
plea itself, this would imply that such pleas should not be vacated solely because the
record does not demonstrate that the judicial obligations of Rule 3.172 were performed.
Since collateral attack would be required, the trial court could arguably take testimony
from defense counsel that he had fully informed the defendant prior to the entering
of the plea, thus rendering the judicial failure non-prejudicial. Decisions such as Brown
v. State, 312 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), which vacated a plea on appeal
because the record did not demonstrate defendant was informed either by the judge
or defense counsel of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, would
be effectively overruled.
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Rule 3.172(h) provides that evidence of a plea, an offer to plead,
or statements made in connection therewith "is not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea
or offer."' 1 By its terms this provision excludes the use of such evi-
dence to impeach as well as to prove guilt in the prosecution's case-
in-chief. The Supreme Court held in Harris v. New York"'0 that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, but not otherwise coerced
or involuntary, could be used to impeach contrary testimony by the
defendant at trial. The rationale of Harris was that "[t]he shield pro-
vided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury
by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior in-
consistent utterances."' 0 2 This policy might apply with equal force to
statements made in connection with a guilty plea. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure I l(e)(6)10 has language identical to Rule 3.172(h),
however, and developments under federal law indicate that the use
of such statement to impeach would not be allowed. 0 4 Federal Rule
of Evidence 410 as originally enacted provided for the impeachment
use of such evidence.' 0 5 The conference committee report to Rule 410,
however, noted that Congress was considering this same issue with
regard to proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(e)(6), and
the intent of the conferees was that if inconsistent provisions were
adopted in Rule 1 l(e)(6), they would be controlling. 06
Rule I l(e)(6) provides for the use of guilty-plea-related statements
in subsequent perjury prosecutions if the statements were made under
oath, but makes no mention of the use of such statements for impeach-
ment. Rule 410 was then amended by Congress to eliminate the pro-
vision allowing the impeachment use of guilty-plea-related state-
ments.
1 07
This amendment demonstrates that the omission of any reference
100. Rule 3.172(h), unlike FEn. R. CtIM. P. 11(e)(6), does not provide that state-
ments made in connection with a guilty plea would be admissible in a subsequent
perjury prosecution. Rule 3.172(c)(vi) states that the trial judge must advise the de-
fendant that he may be questioned under oath about the offense and his answers used
in a later prosecution for perjury. Presumably, then, the intent was to make such
statements admissible in a perjury prosecution although Rule 3.172(h) does not so state.
101. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
102. Id. at 226. See also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), where the
Court unanimously decided that a possible violation of a grand jury witness's privilege
against self-incrimination would not preclude use of the grand jury testimony in a
perjury prosecution.
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(6).
104. See FED. R. EvD. 410.
105. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 410 (1975).
106. Id., historical note.
107. FED. R. EvD. 410.
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to impeachment in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was in-
tentional. Although Florida Rule 3.172(h) copies the language of
Federal Rule 1 (e) (6), the same conclusions would not necessarily be
compelled.',"
IV. PRETRIAL MOTIONS AND DEFENSES
A. Rule 3.190. Pretrial Motions
Rule 3.190(c)(4), unchanged by the amendments, provides that
the defendant may move to dismiss the charging instrument where
"[t]here are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do
not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. The facts
on which such motion is based should be specifically alleged and the
motion sworn to."
The supreme court has stated that the purpose of this rule is "to
avoid a trial when all the material facts are not genuinely in issue and
could legally support only one judgment." 10 19 The rule, if liberally
interpreted, could have considerable utility, since the defense would
not be forced to trial to determine the factual sufficiency of the state's
case. In many situations, the defense would accept a favorable plea
bargain rather than go to trial even though there is a chance of a
judgment of acquittal." 0 Under prior Rule 3.190(d), however, the
state could traverse allegations of fact in the defense motion. If a
traverse is filed, the trial court may not resolve the issue of fact alleged
to exist but must automatically deny the motion to dismiss."' Since the
probability of a guilty plea is increased if the state can defer a ruling
on the factual sufficiency of its case, and since the state can defeat the
motion simply by filing a traverse, an issue has arisen regarding the
good faith nature of the state's traverse." 2 Prior Rule 3.190(d) stated
that the motion should be denied "if the State files a traverse which
denies under oath a material fact alleged in the motion to dismiss." ' s
This has been amended to require that the traverse deny "with
108. See Hutto v. Ross, 97 S. Ct. 202 (1976), finding no violation of the fifth
amendment where a confession made by a defendant as part of a plea bargain was
admitted in the state's case-in-chief in an Arkansas prosecution.
109. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1971).
110. Id. A favorable ruling on a motion to dismiss is different from a judgment of
acquittal in the important respect that jeopardy has not attached with the former, and
the state may recharge if additional evidence is discovered.
111. State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
112. In State v. Hamlin, 306 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the court
held the state traverse did not have to be supported by affidavits or sworn testimony
of those with personal knowledge of the facts. The sworn statement of the prosecution
is sufficient.
113. 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. 264 (West 1975).
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specificity" the material fact or facts alleged in the motion. This
probably requires the prosecution only to designate the particular facts
which it disputes. The Committee Note does not explain the meaning
of "with specificity" but refers to State v. Kemp. 1 14 In Kemp, the court
held a statement that "[t]he State traverses to the Defendant's sworn
Motion to Dismiss" was insufficient, the apparent deficiency being
that the state had failed to specify the particular material facts which
it disputed. 1 s
B. Rule 3.191. Speedy Trial
Rule 3.191 contains many problematic areas." 6 The amendment
to Rule 3.191, however, deals with only one problem, and that one
only partially. Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv) previously provided that the rele-
vant speedy trial time "may at any time be waived or extended by
order of the court [for] . . . (iv) a period of reasonable and necessary
delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to . . .
interlocutory appeals . ".".."117 This phraseology raised significant ques-
114. 305 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
115. Id. at 834.
116. Consider the following: (1) Does the speedy trial rule begin to run when a
detainer is filed against a person in custody for another charge? Compare State ex rel.
Williams v. Eastmore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) with State v. Sutton,
269 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). (2) Does the speedy trial rule begin
to run on a subsequent charge when defendant is arrested on one charge but. not
formally charged with a second crime arising from the same criminal episode and on
which there is probable cause to charge? Compare Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) with Kelly v. State, 293 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
See also State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
(3) Does a defense motion for a continuance of a pretrial hearing waive or extend the
relevant speedy trial times? See State v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). (4) Does a defense motion to continue the trial date to a time still well
within the speedy trial time-limit waive the speedy trial rule absent an express waiver?
See King v. State, 303 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Swanson v. Love, 290
So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Griffith v. State, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d
Dist.- Ct. App. 1974). (5) What is the effect of the defense's engagement in discovery
at the expiration of the speedy trial time-a circumstance which the supreme court
has said makes the defendant unavailable for trial and thus ineligible for the protections
of the rule, Rubiera v. Dade County ex tel. Benitez, 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1974)-where
the late discovery is caused by state delay in filing a formal charge? See State ex rel.
Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Sumbry v. State, 310 So. 2d
445 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). (6) Under what circumstances, if any, should the
trial judge be empowered to grant an extension of the speedy trial time where the
state has sought appellate review of a pretrial order by petition for writ of certiorari?
See State v. Williams, 344 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Esperti v. State, 276
So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). (7) Does a defendant who successfully obtains a
change of venue waive the speedy trial time limits? See State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards,
233 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1970), decided under the previous speedy trial statute, Act of
June 22, 1961, ch. 61-419, 1961 Fla. Laws 917 (formerly codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 915
(1969)).
117. 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. 310-11 (West 1975).
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tions: Is an appeal by the state from an order dismissing the charging
instrument an "interlocutory appeal"? May the trial court extend the
speedy trial time where the state seeks review of a pretrial order by
petition for writ of certiorari? If the review sought by the state clearly
is an interlocutory appeal, does the trial court have discretion to deny
an extension when it considers the appeal unmeritorious?
The amendment has answered the first of these questions by pro-
viding for an order of extension "for an appeal by the State from an
order dismissing the case . . . ." Prior to this amendment, the supreme
court held in State v. Glidewell"11 not only that such an extension
could be granted, but also that it was mandatory for the trial court
to do so.119 The language of the rule, however, is discretionary, and
arguably the extension should not be granted as a matter of course in
all cases. The Glidewell court stated as its rationale that "[t]he delay
should not be charged against the state because it was caused by the
defendant's motion to dismiss." 1" ° But if the state could cure the defect
by filing a new charging instrument, and the defendant is incarcerated
because he is unable to post bond, it might be preferable to delay
appellate review until after conviction, or forego appellate review if
the defendant is acquitted. In cases where a substantial issue-e.g., the
constitutionality of the statute under which defendant has been
charged-has been determined against the state, the appeals court
could order an extension if the trial court abused its discretion in
denying an extension.-2 '
The same issue has arisen where the state took an interlocutory
appeal from an order suppressing evidence. In State v. Canon,12 2 the
court discharged the defendant because the speedy trial time had
expired while an interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing evi-
dence was being taken. The state had failed to seek an order of exten-
sion from the trial court and argued that an automatic stay should
have been given. Not confronted with the issue of whether the trial
court must grant an extension 'when sought, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that an order was required to extend the speedy trial
time because there was not an automatic stay. 23 The court implied,
118. 311 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
119. See also Tucker v. State, 344 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), which
recognized that 3.191(d)(iv) might not authorize extensions for appeals from dismissals
of the charging instrument, but then rejected such an interpretation.
120. 311 So. 2d at 128.
121. This was the technique used in State v. Glidewell, where the trial court had
denied two motions for extension by the state. But see State v. Pearce, 336 So. 2d 1274,
1277 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), suggesting that such power might not exist.
122. 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
123. Accord, Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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however, that an extension would be discretionary, stating: "A contrary
ruling would mean that the state could automatically deprive a de-
fendant of the benefits of the Speedy Trial Rule . . .merely by filing
an appeal from an order of suppression and without any judicial
determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken
simply for the purpose of securing such a delay.' ' 12 4
In State v. Pearce,12 5 however, the court held that section 924.071(2)
of the Florida Statutes provides for an automatic stay where the state
appeals an order suppressing evidence or a confession; in addition, the
court found that the statute was adopted as a rule of the court.'2
The court stated that the discretionary power implied by Rule
3.191(d)(2)(iv) was intended to apply to interlocutory appeals other
than those involving suppression of evidence. 27 Regarding the need
to supervise possibly unmeritorious appeals by the state, the court
observed:
124. 332 So. 2d at 127.
125. 336 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
126. FLA. App. R. 6.3(b) states:
Appeals pursuant to Section 924.071, Florida Statutes 1967, shall be taken within
[30 days after the order or sentence appealed from is entered], or prior to the
commencement of the trial whichever is sooner, The procedure for such appeals
shall be as provided in Rule 4.2. Such appeals shall be given priority on the
docket.
FLA. STAT. § 924.071(2) states:
An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each
defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is
determined. If the trial court determines that the evidence, confession, or ad-
mission that is the subject of the order would materially assist the state in
proving its case against another defendant and that the prosecuting attorney
intends to use it for that purpose, the court shall stay the case of that defendant
until the appeal is determined. A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either
automatically or by order of the court shall be released on his own recognizance
pending the appeal if he is charged with a bailable offense.
127. In 1971, when the speedy trial was drafted, then FLA. STAT. § 924.07 authorized
interlocutory appeals in numerous situations, including, under § 924.07(8), one appeal
from any pretrial order objected to by the state. The supreme court subsequently held
this provision unconstitutional in State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972), on the
ground that the constitutional power to provide for interlocutory review lay ex-
clusively in the supreme court. Id. at 490. The court observed that the only inter-
locutory appeal provided for in the appellate rules was the one from an order suppressing
evidence or a confession, FLA. App. R. 6.3, and the other interlocutory appeals provided
for by statute were unconstitutional. The decision in Pearce effectively eliminates the
only situation where the trial court could exercise discretion regarding an interlocutory
appeal, i.e., an appeal from an order suppressing evidence or a confession. The court
did not find this an anomalous result, however, since Smith was decided after Rule
3.191 was adopted. The intent of the supreme court in 1971 could have been as stated
in Pearce, although the 1972 Smith decision would have nullified such an intent.
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Finally, an automatic extension of the Rule 3.191 trial period
does not leave the defendant without a remedy for a dilatory or
frivolous appeal by the State. If the matter presented on appeal is
so insignificant, the State's position so untenable or the appellate
delay so prejudicial that the accused is deprived of his constitution-
ally secured right to a speedy trial, those matters may be asserted
by a motion for discharge which is based directly on the Constitu-
tion rather than on rights derived from Rule 3.191.128
It is noteworthy that the state did not seek an extension from the
trial court in either Canon or Pearce.129 The typical situation may be
one where, through prosecutorial oversight, no extension is sought,
rather than one where an extension is sought and denied by the trial
court. The Pearce decision has the merit of avoiding the frustration of
justice through a perceived technicality while retaining a constitutional
safety valve for egregious cases. On the other hand, it can be argued
that Pearce undervalues the defendant's right to a speedy trial. The
control exercised by the trial judge under the rule-rather than under
the constitutional standard suggested in Pearce-would undoubtedly
require closer scrutiny of the merits of the appeal, and the state's
failure to seek an extension, although a technicality, is perhaps not
excusable. 1 3' These competing considerations would apply with equal
relevance to state appeals from orders dismissing the charging instru-
ment, as in State v. Glidewell.'s'
Glidewell involved a situation where the state had sought exten-
sions which were denied by the trial court. Prosecutorial neglect has
also arisen, however, where the appeal was from an order dismissing
the charging instrument. Such was the case in Tucker v. State." 2 As in
Pearce, the court avoided what appeared to be a frustration of justice
through technicality by finding an "automatic" provision. Since the
Pearce court's automatic stay of section 924.071(2) applies only to
appeals from suppression orders, the Tucker court looked elsewhere
and found its needed support in Rule 3.191(g)." Although the
128. 336 So. 2d at 1278.
129. In Cannon, as previously indicated, the state had apparently neglected to seek
an extension. In Pearce, the state originally sought and was granted an extension after
it had perfected the interlocutory appeal, The trial court subsequently held its order
of extension was void since the appeal had divested it of jurisdiction. This ruling was
reversed, of course, by the Pearce holding that a stay was automatic.
130. Although conflict exists between Cannon and Pearce, the defendant in Pearce
apparently did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the supreme court. FLA.
CONsT. art. 5, § 3(b)(3). No further proceedings have been reported.
131. 311 So. 2d 126.
132. 344 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
133. FLA. R. QuM. P. 3.191(g) states:
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language of 3.191(g) seems to comprehend only orders of a second
trial after a first trial has either been aborted by a mistrial or the
conviction has been reversed by the trial or appellate court, the Tucker
court applied it to their facts since "there is no specific provision in the
Rule for a first trial after reversal of an order dismissing an informa-
tion.' ' 134 The difficulty with this reasoning is that 3.191(d)(2)(iv) clearly
does cover such appeals as exemplified by State v. Glidewell and the
Tucker decision. Tucker states: "It should be noted, however, that
where motions are made by the state prior to appeal, then resort to
either subsection (d) (2)(iv) or subsection (g) may be in order."'1 5 The
import of this statement is not altogether clear since there is a significant
difference between an extension under (d)(2)(iv) and the automatic
application of (g). Rule 3.191(g) would give the state ninety days from
the date of receipt by the trial court of the appeals court mandate to
bring the defendant to trial. An extension, on the other hand, would
simply toll the speedy trial time for the period necessary to obtain a
final appellate ruling. The state would then have whatever time re-
mained on the relevant speedy trial time limit when the order
of extension was entered to bring the defendant to trial. This time
might be more or less than ninety days.13  The above quoted language
Effect of Mistrial; Order of New Trial. A person who is to be tried again
shall be brought to trial within 90 days from the date of declaration of a
mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the trial court granting a new
trial, the date of an order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of judg-
ment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice
of whatever form from an appellate or other reviewing court which makes
possible a new trial for the defendant, whichever is last in time.
134. 344 So. 2d at 287, quoting State v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
135. 344 So. 2d at 287 (footnote omitted).
136. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 344 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
where the state sought review of an order excluding state witnesses. Although the state
styled its pleading as an interlocutory appeal, the appeals court properly considered
it a petition for common law certiorari. On day 135, the state sought an extension of
the 180-day speedy trial time "for the period of time necessary to complete appellate
procedures instituted in the above-styled cause." Id. at 313. The extension was granted
by the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the effect of the extension was to
give the state 45 days from the completion of appellate proceedings to bring the de-
fendant to trial. The court reasoned that 3.191(g) did not apply because "the state's
appeal which brought the trial delay was unsuccessful." Id. at 312 (footnote omitted).
Under this rationale, the 90-day period of 3.191(g) would apparently govern in any
interlocutory review situation where the state was successful on appeal notwithstanding
the express terms of the trial court's extension order. The court added:
Questions as to whether or to what extent the speedy trial time should be
tolled for appeal or certiorari are continuing to occur. There seems to be little
uniformity on the subject, and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 as now written does not
provide ready answers to these questions. Accordingly, we have determined to
certify this decision to the supreme court as representative of those cases in
FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
from Tucker could mean that the state may benefit from whichever
provision gives the state the longer time before trial.
A final problem involving interlocutory review concerns the cir
cumstances under which the state may delay the speedy trial time to
seek review of an order by petition for writ of certiorari. This issue
was first addressed in Esperti v. State,137 which noted that 3.19 1 (d)(2)(iv),
by its terms, provides for extensions for interlocutory appeals but not
for petitions for writs of certiorari. The court observed that this omis-
sion had some logic to it and thus probably was not an oversight:
"Interlocutory appeals are specifically mentioned as grounds for time
extensions because issues which are interlocutorily appealable are likely
to have a direct bearing on proceedings below. Certiorari proceed-
ings are often only tangentially related to the trial proceedings them-
selves."138 The court declined to hold that an extension should never
be granted for certiorari review, however:
In view of the diverse types of questions which may be raised
through extraordinary writs we do not here hold that no certiorari
proceedings may be treated as interlocutory appeals for purposes
of speedy trial rules. Some questions so brought may have a direct
bearing on the trial itself and would justify a time extension.139
Thus, under Esperti, the focal issue regarding extensions for certiorari
review would seem to be the opposite of that previously discussed.
Whereas the issue before was whether the trial court must grant an
extension, here the issue has become whether the trial court should
grant an extension and-where the state has obtained such an extension
from the trial court-whether the defense may later move for discharge
on the ground that the issue sought to be reviewed was not sufficiently
central to the merits of the case to justify extension.' 40
which the state has unsuccessfully sought appellate review. At the same time, we
are also certifying our decision in Tucker v. State, supra, as representing a case in
which the state was successful in having the ruling of the lower court over-
turned. By this procedure we hope to provide a vehicle for the supreme court
to clarify the procedures to be followed in this area of law.
Id. at 313.
137. 276 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
138. Id. at 64. A good example of a case where certiorari review might have involved
only a tangentially related matter is State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972). The
state there sought review of a trial court order requiring certain eyewitnesses to undergo
an eye examination.
139. 276 So. 2d at 64.
140. If an extension has been erroneously granted by the trial court, it should be
noted that the speedy trial time would continue to run only until the appellate court
granted the petition for the writ. This action would take the record out of the trial
court and operate as a supersedeas. Id.
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The Esperti issue has not been raised again in later reported de-
cisions. In State v. Williams,141 the state had petitioned for certiorari
review of a trial court order excluding state witnesses. But the central
issue was the effect, not the propriety, of the trial court's extension
order." 2 The court apparently approved of the extension and observed:
As suggested by Esperti, there may be occasions in which the state
finds its case seriously jeopardized by what it believes to be an
erroneous interlocutory ruling from which there is no right of appeal.
Then, the state's only recourse is to file a petition for certiorari
because if the case goes to trial jeopardy will attach and the state
will have lost its right to have the order reviewed except by cross-
appeal. Under these circumstances, there ought to be a way to toll
the speedy trial time until after there has been a disposition of the
certiorari proceedings. 43
In sum, numerous difficult issues surround the interplay between
the defendant's right to be brought to trial within a specified time
and the state's right to interlocutory review of certain issues. The
amendment to Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv) deals only with the least difficult
of these issues.
C. Rule 3.210. Competency To Stand Trial and Be Sentenced:
Insanity as a Defense
In an effort to develop procedures in harmony with the constitu-
tional requirements of Jackson v. Indiana,14 the amendment to Rule
3.210 extensively rewrites the provision of the prior rule dealing with
competency to stand trial. The amendment did not substantially change
the prior rule regarding the procedures incident to the defense of in-
sanity, but it clarified the procedures to be followed upon an acquittal
by reason of insanity as covered by Rule 3.460. The amendment, how-
ever, may become merely a historical curiosity: Rule 3.2 10, as amended,
was repealed effective October 1, 1977, by House Bill 35 enacted by
the 1977 Legislature . 45 As required by the Florida Constitution,146 the
repeal provision passed each house of the legislature by two-thirds vote
of the membership. This section will concentrate on the provisions of
House Bill 35.7
141. 344 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
142. See discussion at note 136 and accompanying text supra.
143. 344 So. 2d at 312 n.4.
144. 406 U.S. 71t (1972).
145. Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 77-312, 1977 Fla. Laws 1324 [hereinafter House Bill
35].
146. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2(a).
147. It should be noted that although FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2(a), gives the legisla-
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1. Competency To Stand Trial.-Jackson v. Indiana14s is the constitu-
tional benchmark against which the procedures governing competency
to stand trial issue must be measured. In Jackson, a deaf mute charged
with robbery was determined, after a hearing at which expert testi-
mony was received, to be incompetent to stand trial. Solely upon
that determination he was committed to a state hospital until the de-
partment of mental health should certify he was sane. The defendant
argued that automatic commitment because he " 'lacked comprehension
sufficient to make his defense,' "149 denied him equal protection of the
law. In the absence of a pending criminal charge, the state would have
had to proceed against him under Indiana's civil commitment statutes.
The Court agreed with this contention, at least insofar as defendant's
disability appeared permanent and therefore his commitment was not
temporary. 50
The Court relied heavily on Baxstrom v. Herold,1' 1 which dealt
with a prisoner nearing the end of his penal term who was civilly
committed under procedures substantially different from those for
general civil commitment. The prisoner in Baxstrom had been com-
ture the power to repeal rules promulgated by the supreme court, it does not give the
legislature the power to write rules. See Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975); In re
Clarification of the Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973).
Thus, to the extent the provisions of House Bill 35 are considered procedural, they
can have affect only if the supreme court adopts them by rule.
On October 6, 1977, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, In and For
Dade County, Fla., declared §§ 1-9 of House Bill 35 "unconstitutional, invalid, and
void as contrary to the provisions of Article V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution."
State v. Hunter, Nos. 72-8323A & 72-8683A, slip op. at I (Fla. Cir, Ct. Dade County,
October 6, 1977). The court also asserted:
It is just as obvious that this declaration of invalidity as to Sections 1-9 renders
invalid the provisions of Section 10 of the statute which purports to repeal
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210. Although the Legislature may indeed,
by separate enactment, validly repeal a rule of procedure; there can be no doubt,
notwithstanding the "severability clause" contained in Section 11 of the statute,
that Section 10 cannot stand alone. If this were not the case, the State of Florida
would be left with no valid rule or statute dealing with this important, even vital,
subject in the administration of criminal justice. Thus, Section 10 must fall as well.
Id. To date, the supreme court has not acted to adopt the provisions of House Bill 35.
In the past, the supreme court has regularly adopted the procedural provisions of
legislation. For example, in 1976 the legislature repealed the provision of Rule 3.130(a)
(which gave the trial court discretion to grant bail on appeal in all cases) and provided
that in certain circumstances bail should not be available on appeal. FLA. STAT. § 903.132
(1976 Supp.). The provisions of the statute were adopted by the 1977 amendment to
Rule 3.691(a). It does not necessarily follow, however, that the supreme court will always
adopt verbatim the procedural provisions of legislation. If the court does not, the
only legislative recourse would be repeal of the new rule.
148. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
149. Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 730.
151. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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mitted on the finding of a surrogate's court rather than after a jury
trial as required for other civil commitments. The state had argued
that the different procedure was justified by Baxstrom's previous
criminal conviction. The Baxstrom Court rejected the argument,
stating that "there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the
commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from
all other civil commitments. ' ' 152 Relying on this finding, the Jackson
Court concluded: "If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence
are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all
others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice."' 153
The Court then found that under the Indiana law, the procedures
for committing persons charged with a crime were substantially similar
152. Id. at 111-12.
153. 406 U.S. at 724. Following this statement, the Court cited with approval
Commonwealth v. Druken, 254 N.E.2d 779 (Mass. 1969). Druken dealt with a statutory
scheme permitting those charged with a crime to be civilly committed under different
procedures than provided for by the general civil commitment statutes. The procedural
differences were described by the Druken court -as follows:
Unless the provisions for commitment under § 105 [the criminal statute] in-
volve application of the safeguards found in §§ 51 and 53 [the general civil commit-
ment provisions], the procedures under § 105 and under §§ 51 and 53 would be
substantially different. Section 51 requires certification of mental illness by two
physicians. There are limitations under § 53 on the period of time allowed to
elapse between the physician's examination of a person and the making of oath
to the certificate, and between certification and the commitment. Under § 53,
also, the certifying physicians can hold no office or appointment, other than that
of consulting or advisory physician, in the institution to which the person is
committed, and where practicable, at least one of the two physicians making
the certificate shall be a diplomate in psychiatry of the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology, Incorporated (American Board). Section 51A . . .
provides that in the case of any person where a commitment to Bridgewater is
found to be necessary, there must be a review of his mental status within sixty
days and periodic review thereafter, with notice to be given to the person con-
fined and his nearest relative or guardian. No such explicit provisions appear
in § 105 standing alone.
In the present case, the defendant was certified as mentally ill only by one
physician, Dr. Samuel Allen. This physician also happened to be the acting medical
director of the hospital to which the defendant was committed. Furthermore, he
was not a diplomate in psychiatry of the American Board. Since the judge specifically
ruled that the commitment of the defendant was pursuant to § 105, rather than
§ 51A, the review provisions of § 51A were held not to be applicable.
Id. at 780.
This language from Druken is important since it is some indication of the types
of procedural differences-as opposed to differences in the substantive criteria for commit-
ment-which may have constitutional significance. Consider, for instance, the procedural
differences between FLA. STAT. § 918.017(2), created by § I of House Bill 35, providing
for commitment of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity, and FIA. STAT. § 394.467
(2)-(3) (1975) regarding civil commitment generally. This is discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 205-42 infra.
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to procedures under the civil commitment statutes.1 5 4 The substantive
standards, however, for commitment and release of the criminally
charged were significantly less stringent than those required for civil
commitment generally and thus violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' 5 This holding was conditioned by
the Court's finding that Jackson's commitment as incompetent to
stand trial amounted to a de facto indefinite commitment due to the
nature of his disability, and that different standards and procedures
for a short-term commitment to determine the nature and probable
154. The Court stated:
Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protec-
tions of the substantive requirements for commitment that are available to all
others. In this case commitment procedures under all three statutes appear sub-
stantially similar: notice, examination by two doctors, and a full judicial hearing
at which the individual is represented by counsel and can cross-examine witnesses
and introduce evidence. Under each of the three statutes, the commitment deter-
mination is made by the court alone, and appellate review is available.
406 U.S. at 727.
155. Regarding the standard of commitment, the Court observed:
Under § 9-1706a [the criminal statute], the State needed to show only Jackson's
inability to stand trial. We are unable to say that, on the record before us, Indiana
could have civilly committed him as mentally ill under § 22-1209 or committed him
as feeble-minded under § 22-1907. The former requires at least (1) a showing of
mental illness and (2) a showing that the individual is in need of "care, treatment,
training or detention." § 22-1201(1). Whether Jackson's mental deficiency would
meet the first test is unclear; neither examining physician addressed himself to
this. Furthermore, it is problematical whether commitment for "treatment" or
"training" would be appropriate since the record establishes that none is avail-
able for Jackson's condition at any state institution. The record also fails to
establish that Jackson is in need of custodial care or "detention." He has been
employed at times, and there is no evidence that the care he long received at
home has become inadequate. The statute appears to require an independent
showing of dangerousness ("requires . . . detention in the interest of the welfare
of such persons or . . . others . . ."). Insofar as it may require such a showing,
the pending criminal charges are insufficient to establish it, and no other support-
ing evidence was introduced. For the same reasons, we cannot say that this record
would support a feeble-mindedness commitment under § 22-1907 on the ground
that Jackson is "unable properly to care for [himself]." § 22-1801.
Id. at 727-28 (footnote omitted). Regarding the standard of release, the Court stated:
More important, an individual committed as feeble-minded is eligible for re-
lease when his condition "justifies it," § 22-1814, and an individual civilly com-
mitted as mentally ill when the "superintendent or administrator shall discharge
such person, or [when] cured of such illness." § 22-1223 (emphasis supplied). Thus,
in either case release is appropriate when the individual no longer requires
the custodial care or treatment or detention that occasioned the commitment, or
when the department of mental health believes release would be in his best
interests. The evidence available concerning Jackson's past employment and
home care strongly suggests that under these standards he might be eligible for
release at almost any time, even if he did not improve. On the other hand, by
the terms of his present § 9-1706a commitment, he will not be entitled to release
at all, absent an unlikely substantial change for the better in his condition.
Id. at 728-29 (footnotes omitted).
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duration of defendant's incompetency might be constitutionally
tolerable.156 The Court then held that such a short-term commitment
would be subject to the following limitations under due process of
law:
We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a
criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity
to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.
If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must
either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that
would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or re-
lease the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the
defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued
commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. In light
of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence
in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt
to prescribe arbitrary time limits. We note, however, that petitioner
Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a
record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial proba-
bility that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.157
The constitutional teachings of Jackson, therefore, are that one
charged with a criminal offense and found incompetent to stand trial
may be committed on a short-term basis under procedures and
standards different from those applicable to civil commitment generally.
A determination of substantial probability of improvement supported
by progress toward that goal must be made within a reasonable period
of time. If such a determination is not made, or it is determined that
there is no such substantial probability of improvement, the defendant
must be released or committed under the generally applicable civil
commitment process. 58
156. See id. at 725-26.
157. 406 U.S. at 738-39 (footnote omitted).
158. The Jackson decision does not speak to the substantive standard for determining
incompetency to stand trial. In the federal criminal case of Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402 (1960), the Court found the appropriate standard to be whether the defendant
"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him." Id. Hence, an ability to recite the facts and assist in
defense is not sufficient competency absent some appreciation of the nature of the pro-
ceedings. Although Dusky was a federal criminal case, its holding has been used as
the constitutional standard as well. United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d 1092,
1095 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972); Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1965). House
Bill 35 adopted the Dusky standard verbatim in § 4, creating FLA. STAT. § 918.15.
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House Bill 35 almost certainly meets, and probably exceeds, the
constitutional standards set forth in Jackson.'"5 It creates Florida statu-
tory section 925.10 entitled "Procedure when defendant is incompetent
to stand trial."'160 Section 925.10 procedures are activated if the judge
has reasonable ground to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand
trial. The judge may notice this sua sponte or upon motion of the
defense or prosecuting attorney. The court may then order the de-
fendant taken into custody or may permit the defendant to remain
at large during evaluation. If the defendant is taken into custody pend-
ing a determination of competency, the statute contemplates an expedi-
tious determination of whether the defendant meets the standards for
civil commitment. 161 The defendant is ordered to a mental health re-
viewing facility (or "retardation diagnosis and evaluation team") which
must complete within five days an evaluation of whether the defendant
is civilly committable. 62 The court then conducts a hearing to deter-
mine this issue. No time limit is specified for this initial hearing, but
the tenor of the statute is that it be as soon as possible after evaluation.
The outcome of this hearing determines the procedures to be followed
in resolving the competency issue.'
6
3
If the defendant does not meet the standards for civil commitment,
the court must appoint not more than three expert witnesses, who are
either psychiatrists or psychologists, to diagnose and evaluate de-
fendant's mental condition. 6 4 A hearing on competency must be held
by the court within five days of the appointment of the experts. If
the defendant is found incompetent, he "may be released on reasonable
bail or other appropriate release conditions for a period not to exceed
6 months."'6 5 The court may order outpatient treatment during this'
159. The same could not be said for the amendment to Rule 3.210, repealed by the
statute. See 343 So. 2d 1256-60.
160. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 5.
161. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1975) provides in relevant part:
(1) CRITERIA.-A person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally
ill and because of his illness is:
(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or
(b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a
responsible application on his own behalf.
162. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 5 (creating FLA. STAT. § 925.10(1)). [Herein-
after sections of the Florida Statutes created by House Bill 35 will be cited parenthetically
by new section number.]
163. Id. (§ 925.10(1)(a)).
164. Id. (§ 925.10(1)(a)(2.).
165. Id. (§ 925.10(l)(a)2.b.). A troublesome aspect of § 925.10 as created is the fre-
quent use of the permissive "may" when no other alternative is statutorily authorized.
The above quoted provisions, for instance, implies the judge need not release the de-
fendant on some reasonable release condition even though he has been found not to
meet the civil commitment standards. Although this might be appropriate in some
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six-month period and hold additional hearings to ascertain if the de-
fendant has regained his competency. If not, the court "may" dismiss
all charges at the end of the six-month period. A defendant who does
not meet the criteria for civil commitment but is found incompetent
to stand trial would thus be entitled to conditional release within
approximately ten days of being taken into custody, and to a final re-
lease after six months.116  This procedure will probably be used rarely,
since most defendants who are found not to meet the civil commit-
ment standards will also be found competent to stand trial.
If it is determined by the court after the initial hearing that the
defendant does meet the standards for civil commitment, the pro-
cedure is different and the custodial restraint of the defendant more
lengthy. The defendant is ordered committed to a Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services intake facility, where his com-
petency is evaluated within thirty days.167 A hearing must be held
within the same thirty-day period to determine competency. If the
defendant is found incompetent to stand trial he is returned for an
additional stay not to exceed sixty days, within which time another
competency hearing must be held. Three consecutive sixty-day periods
are permitted. If at the end of that time the defendant remains in-
competent, "the court may dismiss all charges and order an involun-
tary admission hearing as provided in sections 393.11 or 394.467."168
A period of roughly 210 days may thus elapse, during which the de-
fendant is custodially restrained without the initiation of civil commit-
ment procedures. This detention is justified, however, by the trial
court's initial determination, after hearing evidence from the per-
sonnel of the receiving facility, that the defendant meets the standards
for civil commitment. Although this procedure might be significantly
different from that specified for civil commitment generally,'69 this is
circumstances, the statute does not specify such circumstances or, indeed, any alternative
other than release. Thus, although the word "may" is used, the court arguably has no
other authorized alternative.
166. Id. This assumes five days for the initial evaluation of whether defendant meets
the criteria for civil commitment and five days for the competency evaluation. The actual
time will be slightly longer since § 925.10 does not specify any time limit for the hearing
following the initial civil commitment evaluation, nor does it specify a time limit for
the appointment of experts after the court determines the defendant does not meet
the civil commitment standards. (The statute specifies only that the hearing on
competency be held within five days of the appointment of experts.) Id. (§925.10(l)(a)2.).
167. Id. (§ 925.10(l)(a)l.).
168. Id. (§ 925.10(l)(a)l.b.).
169. See FLA. STAT. §§ 394.463, .467 (1975) for the procedures governing involuntary
civil commitment. A court-ordered evaluation must first be obtained by filing a petition
under oath, supported by either the affidavits of two other persons requesting evaluation
or the certificate of a physician stating that he has examined the patient within the
preceding five days and found him mentally ill and in need of evaluation. FLA. STAT. §
282.
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only a temporary commitment for 210 days and probably a reasonable
period of time. Thus, under Jackson, a significant difference in pro-
cedures would not violate equal protection since the commitment is
not indeterminate. At the end of the 210-day period, civil commitment
must be initiated if the defendant is to be further detained.170 Addi-
tionally, once the defendant has been civilly committed, he has the
status of any other civilly committed patient and is subject to the
same release determinationY.7
394.463(2)(b)(l)-(2) (1975). (Evaluation of a defendant under § 925.10(1) does not re-
quire such supporting affidavits). If the court-ordered evaluation indicates the patient
should be involuntarily hospitalized, the administrator of the receiving facility must so
recommend. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2) (1975). This recommendation must be supported
by the opinions of two physicians who have examined the patient within the preceding
five days. (Under § 925.10, no such recommendation or supporting opinions are re-
quired for the initial 210- day hospitalization of the incompetent defendant; the only
requirement is an order of the court after hearing evidence regarding the initial evalua-
tion.)
170. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b), as amended and effective from July 1 to October 1,
1977, probably violated the mandate of Jackson in this regard. The rule permitted open-
ended commitment for renewable one-year periods solely upon the finding of the
trial judge that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial and met the standards
for civil commitment. Rule 3.210(b)(1)(ii). There was no final limit stated in the rule
when civil commitment procedures must be initiated. Rule 3.210(b)(4) specified that if,
at any time after one year after the original incompetency determination, the court
found no substantial probability of the defendant regaining competency, it was required
to commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for
involuntary hospitalization. This provision was constitutionally doubtful since it im-
posed no time limit on the judge's "no substantial probability" decision and because it
authorized the trial judge in the criminal prosecution to commit the defendant without
going through the civil commitment procedures.
171. Section 925.10(l)(a)l.b. states: "If the defendant is involuntarily admitted, prior
to releasing the defendant, the administrator of the facility shall notify the state
attorney's office which was involved in the adjudication of the original criminal case."
The statute does not state the purpose of this notification or give the state attorney
any role to play in the release decision. Presumably, the purpose is to give the state an
opportunity to refile the criminal charges which had been dismissed. See discussion
of the effect of commitment on the Speedy Trial Rule 3.191, text accompanying notes
-116-43 supra.
House Bill 35 also amends FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1975) to add subsection (6), which
provides that if a defendant is civilly committed under § 925.10, upon release -- the
committing court may order that an appropriate system of community follow-up be
utilized ... 
Rule 3.210, as amended, was also of questionable constitutionality regarding the
release procedures after the trial judge has determined there is no substantial probability
of the defendant regaining competency and has entered an order of commitment.
Jackson mandates that the procedure and standard for release for a civilly committed
defendant who had previously been charged with a crime be the same as for all
other involuntarily committed patients. FLA. STAT. § 394.469 (1975) vests the discharge
decision for involuntarily admitted patients in the hospital administrator, whb has
unreviewable power of release unless he determines to retain the patient for more than six
months. A decision to retain beyond six months is subject to review under FLA. STAT. §
394.467(4) (1975), by a hearing examiner appointed by the Department of Health and
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Commitment as incompetent to stand trial of those charged with
misdemeanors has posed an especially acute problem, since the commit-
ment may amount to a more severe sentence than the defendant could
receive if convicted. Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, (enacted
in 1974) provides that "[n]o person charged with a misdemeanor shall
be committed . . . solely by Rule 3.210 . . ., but shall be admitted for
hospitalization and treatment in accordance with the provisions of this
part. " 172 It is unclear, however, whether such an alleged misdemeanant
could be temporarily committed pending a determination of com-
petency for the approximately 210-day period discussed above. Since
House Bill 35 contemplates full civil commitment after the 210-day
period if the defendant remains incompetent, the commitment re-
ferred to in section 394.467(3)(b) must mean a temporary commitment;
otherwise the provision would be rendered a nullity. In other words, if
section 394.467(3)(b) were interpreted to permit the 210-day temporary
commitment authorized under section 925.10 then the procedures for
accused misdemeanants would be identical to those for accused felons.
Therefore, to evaluate a defendant charged with a misdemeanor, it
appears the court could only order the appointment of experts and
hold a hearing within five days as specified by section 925.10(l)(a)2.,
since the initial hearing to determine whether the defendant met the
standards for involuntary hospitalization would be unnecessary. The
defendant may be taken into custody during this period.1 73 An alleged
misdemeanant who was then determined incompetent to stand trial
should be released under appropriate release conditions for a maxi-
mum of six months; if he is then still incompetent, the charges should
be dismissed.
17
4
Rehabilitative Services under FLA. STAT. § 394.457(6) (1975). The hearing examiner's
decision is reviewable by "the circuit court of the county in which the hearing is held
or by the court of original jurisdiction," FLA. STAT. § 394.457(6)(d) (1975). (Under the
procedures contemplated by Jackson and House Bill 35, this is presumably the court
which initially civilly committed the patient and not the criminal court.) But the pro-
vision of Rule 3.210(f) which provides that the hearing examiner shall have no authority
to order release of a defendant who had been committed, but shall only make recom-
mendations to the criminal trial judges, establishes a significantly different procedure for
release and arguably violates the mandate of Jackson. Indeed, the scheme of Rule 3.210
is to give the criminal trial judge exclusive authority over the civil commitment and
release decisions. Jackson, on the other hand, contemplates that the criminal trial
judge will make a decision within a reasonable period of time regarding the "substantial
probability" of regaining competency. Once that determination is made in the negative,
the whole process, both procedurally and substantively, should shift to civil commit-
ment under the applicable statutory provisions.
172. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(3)(b) (1975) (footnote omitted). Rule 3.210(c)(1), as amended,
contains an identical provision.
173. House Bill 35, supra note 145 § 5 (§ 925.10(l)(a)2.).
.174. Id. (§ 925.10(l)(a)2.b.),
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It remains to discuss the effect on the speedy trial rule of delays
occasioned by the above proceedings. Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv) specifically
contemplates an order of extension by the trial judge for "a period of
reasonable and necessary delay resulting from ... an examination and
hearing to determine the mental competency . . . of the defendant
to stand trial .... ." As stated in Esperti v. State:17 5
The rule provides that the periods of time may be extended by order
of the court where certain circumstances exist. As we interpret the
rule the extensions are to be actually granted or denied by the court
and should not be presumed. It is the order and not the circum-
stances which should toll the rule . . . . [S]ome notice of whether
the rule will or will not run as a result of proposed conduct by the
parties should be given by the trial court at each stage of the pro-
ceedings.176
A defense motion for a competency determination should not alone
waive the protections of the speedy trial rule.177 Rather, the relevant
speedy trial period should be extended for the time period necessary
to diagnose and evaluate the defendant and make a final determination
on competency.1 7 8
175. 276 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 614 (1973).
176. 276 So. 2d at 64.
177. Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iii) provides that the defendant may waive speedy trial protec-
tions, but since (d)(2)(iv) expressly contemplates extension rather than waiver for
competency determinations, extension should be the normal consequence.
178. In the ordinary case, the competency decision should be made in roughly 35
days (if defendant is initially committed for diagnosis and evaluation) or 10 days (if
defendant is not committed). Extension, as opposed to waiver, of the speedy trial time
would thus be preferable to the defense if the defendant is found competent after a
single hearing on the issue.
A series of decisions from the Third District Court of Appeal have held that a defense
motion for a competency examination constitutes a waiver of the speedy trial time limits.
Davis v. State, 302 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Chester v. State, 298 So. 2d
529 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Parks v. State, 278 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App.
1973). The logic of these decisions appears to be that the motion for a competency
examination is a delay "due to the unexcused actions or unexcused decisions of the
accused .... ," covered by Rule 3.191(d)(3), and that trial must then only be held within
a reasonable time: within 90 days from a motion for discharge if the defense makes
one or within 60 days from a valid demand for a speedy trial. It is extremely difficult, of
course, to characterize a motion for a mental examination as an "unexcused delay"
where the judge has reasonable ground to believe the defendant is not competent. The
Third District Court of Appeal opinions find some support in State ex rel. Butler v.
Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971), however. There, the defense had requested a con-
tinuance of the trial date because "the State (by myriad unexplained delays) had
unconstitutionally deprived the Defendants of their opportunity to properly prepare
for trial with effective aid of counsel." 253 So. 2d at 862. The trial court granted the
continuance to a date beyond the speedy trial time. The defense then moved for dis-
charge,. which was denied, and sought prohibition from the supreme court. A fair
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After the initial finding of incompetency by the trial judge, sub-
paragraphs 925.10(l)(a)l.b. and 2.b. specify time periods for monitoring
the mental condition of the accused and holding periodic rehearings on
the competency issue. A final decision must be reached within 210 days
(for an accused who has been provisionally committed) or six months
(for an accused who has been released on bail). If the final decision is
one of incompetency, "the court may dismiss all charges. " 179 The issue
then becomes whether the speedy trial rule will continue to be tolled
after the final dismissal of the charges. If the defendant is civilly com-
mitted, it will almost certainly be held that the speedy trial rule will
remain tolled since the defendant is not "continuously available for
trial" as required by Rule 3.191(e). As discussed above, however, the
rule arguably should be tolled, not waived. Thus, if defendant is sub-
sequently found competent and released from hospitalization, the state
should have only the period remaining on the speedy trial time when
the original motion for a competency determination was made to
bring the defendant to trial.180
reading of Cullen indicates the defense was attempting to present the argument that
since the continuance was forced by the state delays, it should not have been attributed
to the defense at all. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 609 (1976); Sumbry v. State, 310 So. 2d 445
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel. Boren v. Sepe, 256 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. discharged, 271 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1972). The defense did not contend
that the period of the continuance should be tacked onto the speedy trial time or that
the trial court should have ordered an extension of the time limit equal to the delay
of the continuance. The supreme court held that the continuance constituted a waiver
of the speedy trial time and that Rule 3.191(d)(3) therefore applied. Nowhere in the
opinion, however, is it satisfactorily explained why the continuance was an "unexcused
[action] . . . of the accused .... 253 So. 2d at 863. A continuance for the convenience
of the defense might be construed as a waiver of the speedy trial time (and this seems
to be the way the court treated the continuance in Cullen), but such a continuance is
certainly very different from an examination for competency where there is reasonable
ground to believe the defendant is incompetent. Thus, although the continuance in
Cullen could be analogized to a motion for a competency determination, the analogy
has little logical support. The essence of the Third District Court's decisions cited above,
as with so many speedy trial decisions that go against the defense, does not reflect
careful logical analysis so much as a judicial aversion to the perceived frustration of
justice through the technicalities of the rule.
179. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 5 (§ 925.10(l)(a)l.b., .10(1)(a)2.b.). Although the
statute appears only to authorize and not require dismissal, it does not provide for any
alternative disposition. See note 165 supra.
180. Section 925.10(l)(a)l.b. provides for notification of the state attorney's office
prior to release. See note 171 supra.
Miller v. State, 332 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976), presented the issue of the effect on the
speedy trial time of a determination of incompetency and order of hospitalization under
Rule 3.210 prior to amendment. The language of Miller is ambiguous and could be in-
terpreted as holding that the determination of incompetency waived the speedy trial
protections of the rule, although waiver language -is not used. The. court stated:-
. . We agree with the-State's argument that--the order placing appellant in the
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If the defendant is not involuntarily committed for diagnosis and
evaluation at the outset, the final determination of incompetency and
dismissal of charges at the end of the six-month period operates only
to remove whatever conditions of release had been imposed. Since it
has already been determined that the defendant does not meet the
criteria for civil commitment, involuntary hospitalization is unlikely
to follow dismissal of the charges. Therefore, the defendant's compe-
tency will not be judicially redetermined. The state could then im-
mediately refile charges and reinstitute the process, or, alternatively,
the dismissal may be with prejudice. If the latter is the case, then the
incompetent defendant who did not meet the criteria for civil commit-
ment would have substantial benefits not enjoyed by one who did,
suggesting a possible equal protection violation.
2. Insanity as a Defense.-House Bill 35 creates, inter alia, section
918.017, Florida Statutes, establishing a bifurcated trial procedure when
the defense of insanity is raised. The new section also specifies pro-
cedures for the disposition of a defendant acquitted on insanity
grounds.'"' The statute provides that "no evidence of insanity shall be
custody of Florida State Hospital tolled the further running of the Speedy Trial
time; that pursuant to Rule 3.210(a)(3), trial judge was notified and returned
appellant to State penal system (sic) August 22, 1973, and pursuant to Rule 3.210,
the judge conducted a competency hearing; that from December 14, 1973, [the
date the trial court ordered defendant competent to stand trial] 65 days passed.
This is dearly within Rule 3.191. See State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 1971).
332 So. 2d at 67 (emphasis added). On the facts of Miller, if the speedy trial time was
tolled from the date of the motion and order for psychiatric examination to the date
of the trial court's order of competency, defendant was brought to trial within 180 days
of his arrest. The quote above, however, suggests that if that had not been the case,
defendant would still not be entitled to discharge since the order of hospitalization
tolled "further running" of the time. The citation to State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen
supports this premise since that decision found the speedy trial time waived rather
than tolled.
181. If these provisions are procedural, the statute is unconstitutional and is only a
recommendation to the supreme court regarding the new insanity rule which should
be adopted to replace repealed Rule 3.210 as amended. See FLA. CONsT. art. v, § 2(a).
Since the repeal takes effect only 90 days after the effective date of House Bill 35 (July
1, 1977), the 1977 amended rule governed trials between July 1 and October 1. The
90-day hiatus was presumably provided to give the supreme court time to adopt the
statutory provisions-or other provisions-by rule. See note 147 supra.
It should be noted in passing that the bifurcated procedure for imposition of the
death penalty established by FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1975) is almost certainly procedural.
This was recognized in Lee v. State, 294 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1974). See also Dobbert v.
Florida, 97 S. Ct. 2290 (1977). Hence, to be operative, the provisions of § 921.141 must
be adopted by supreme court rule pursuant. to FLA. CONsT. art. v, § 2(a). This has not
been done, although the supreme court has by decision added further provisions not
included in the statute. See Lee v. State, 294 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1974). The 1977 amend-
ments..to the criminal rules also create Rule 3.780, which clarifies some of the pro-
cedures under § 921.141. And in State v. Dixon, 283 So.. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), the court
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admitted until it is determined through trial or by plea whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent of committing or attempting to commit
the alleged criminal act."' 2
The determination of guilt may be by guilty plea or trial. The issue
of insanity at the time of the criminal act is then determined "either
by the same trial jury, if applicable, or by a new jury, in the discretion
of the court."'' The defendant may waive jury trial on the issue of
insanity and try the issue to the court.
It is exceedingly unclear just how this statute will operate in cases
where the severity of the offense committed depends upon the de-
fendant's mental state. Murder prosecutions will undoubtedly present
the most difficult situation. If felony murder is not involved, the
degree of guilt will depend on whether the killing was "perpetrated
from a premeditated design" (first degree murder), or was an act
"evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life" (second degree
murder), or, if without either of these states of mind, a killing which
was neither justifiable nor excusable (manslaughter) .114 Florida law
presently recognizes that "impairment of the mental faculties by use
of narcotics or other drugs ... may exist to such an extent that an in-
dividual is incapable of forming an intent to commit a crime, thereby
rendering such person incapable of committing a crime of which a
specific intent is an essential element."''s s Since mental impairment
through drug use is very close to, if not in many cases identical with,
mental disease, 186 it would be logically consistent to hold that mental
illness could negate a required specific intent, as well as provide a
complete defense to all criminal responsibility. In other words, it
would make little sense to permit the defense to introduce evidence
upheld the constitutionality of § 921.141 on various grounds, but never addressed the
issue of the procedural nature of the legislation because it was not raised. On the
whole, it cannot be doubted that the supreme court approves of § 921.141 and would
willingly adopt an identical rule. Nevertheless, it has not done so.
182. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 1 (§ 918.017(1)). Attempt to commit a criminal
offense is itself a criminal act. FLA. STAr. § 777.04 (1975). A literal reading of the statute
thus contemplates a conviction for attempting an attempt. The attempt provision is
unnecessary surplusage. Section 921.131 specifies that insanity is not at issue until guilt
of the "alleged criminal act" is first determined. The "alleged criminal act" undoubtedly
includes not only the offense specified in the charging instrument but also all lesser
included offenses, of which attempt is one. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
183. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 1 (§918.017(1)).
184. FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, .07 (1975).
185. FLA. STD. JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, General Instructions § 2.11(c)
"Intoxication," at 23 (2d ed. 1975).
186. See, e.g., Britts v. State, 30 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1947), and Griffin v. State, 96
So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), recognizing that intoxication can be sufficiently
extreme to constitute temporary insanity.
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of drug-related mental illness to negate a required mens rea, while ex-
cluding evidence of all other mental illness.'87
The intent of the statute is apparently to separate the factual
question of what the defendant did from the issue of insanity. The
difficult question is precisely where proof of the required mens rea
fits into this scheme. The statute limits the first trial to a determina-
tion of whether defendant "is guilty or innocent of committing or
attempting to commit the alleged criminal act."'' 88 Read literally, then,
the statute does not contemplate a fixing of the degree of responsibility
at the first trial, but only whether the defendant did the acts which
caused the criminal result. Questions regarding the identity of the
accused and the defense of alibi would appropriately be determined at
the first trial. All mens rea issues, including the negation of mens rea
by proof of insanity, would be postponed to the second trial. Thus,
issues such as mistake, duress, self-defense, intoxication, and insanity
would be litigated at the second trial. This literal interpretation of
the statutory language minimizes the effect of the legislation; if the
defense intends to rely on insanity, it probably will not dispute the
charge that defendant committed the alleged criminal act. Therefore
most, if not all, such defendants would plead guilty to committing the
alleged criminal act, resulting in a single trial as under the prior
practice.
An alternative interpretation, which would not render the evidence
of insanity ineffective in determining the degree of the offense where
mens rea is the determining factor, would be to admit all evidence
except that dealing with mental illness at the first trial, but postpone
a verdict on the degree of guilt-where it is dependent upon the mental
state of the accused-until after the second trial.' s9 Accordingly, in a
first degree murder prosecution, the first trial would determine whether
the defendant had committed a criminal act. The jury would hear
the state's case proving that defendant's acts caused the death and no
justification or excuse existed, and would receive any defense evidence
offered on these issues. A verdict that the defendant committed the
alleged criminal act would thus be a finding of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that criminal homicide occurred. The second trial would
then fix culpability, i.e., determine if the defendant is culpable and if
187. Such a distinction could not be based on a distrust of the probative value of
medical expert testimony, since such testimony would be admissible regarding the
drug- or alcohol-related illness. See Dix. Mental Illness, Criminal Intent and the Bi-
furcated Trial, 1970 LAW AND Soc. ORDER 559, 562-72.
188. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 1 (§ 918.017(1)) (emphasis added).
189. In crimes such as robbery, FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (1975), where the severity of the
offense depends on proof of facts unrelated to mens rea, this would be determined
in the first trial.
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so, the degree of culpability, in light of the evidence presented on
mental illness. Thus, at the conclusion of the first trial the court's
instructions to the jury would focus on the distinction between
criminal homicide and excusable or justifiable homicide. At the con-
clusion of the second trial, the court would instruct the jury on the
degrees of murder, manslaughter, and the defense of insanity.
It should be noted that this approach would not require the adop-
tion in Florida of the concept of "diminished capacity," i.e., the doctrine
that evidence of mental illness can explicitly go to the inability of
the defendant to entertain a required mens rea. 190 Under the prior
practice of a unitary trial, however, the evidence of insanity was surely
considered by the jury in fixing the degree of guilt, even when it con-
cluded there was no reasonable doubt as to sanity. And Florida law
is quite explicit that a jury may appropriately dispense lenity in fixing
the degree of guilt lower than that required by, or even colorably
supported by, the evidence. 191 Arguably, the jury should not be de-
prived of the evidence of mental illness in dispensing lenity, even
though no instruction would formally be given that it could so consider
it. This seems particularly true if the jury may consider evidence of
drug- or alcohol-related mental problems in deciding the degree of
guilt.
This latter interpretation of the statute, then, has the merit of
separating the general issue of the criminality of the defendant's acts
from the receipt of expert testimony. It forces the jury to adopt an
analysis which it should, but might not, use in a unitary trial. The
state must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
the person whose acts caused the proscribed criminal result and that
no defenses other than insanity exist. 9 2 These questions would be
resolved without the confusing intrusion of medical expert testimony
regarding mental illness. Since the issues of mens rea and insanity
seem inextricably related, the degree of guilt (when dependent on
the mens rea of the accused) should not be determined until after the
second trial on sanity. 93
190. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946); People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d
492 (Calif. 1959); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1972).
Florida has not judicially accepted such a doctrine. See Ezzel v. State, 88 So. 2d 280,
282 (Fla. 1956). FLA. STD. JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, General Instructions
§ 2.11(b) "Insanity," at 20 (2d ed. 1975), recognizes insanity only as a complete defense.
191. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970).
192. A homicide case can be envisioned, for instance, where the defendant might
claim both self-defense and insanity. A sexual battery prosecution could involve ques-
-tions of consent and insanity.
193. Florida decisions exist which acknowledge the close relationship of insanity
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Section 921.131 also provides:
Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the issue of sanity regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence, except as prohibited by the
Constitutions of the United States or State of Florida; provided,
however, that the defendant is given the opportunity to rebut any
such evidence.' 94
If relevancy is the sole criterion of admissibility, then the hearsay
rule is suspended as well as, perhaps, evidentiary privileges. 95 In the
typical case, the trial on sanity may involve only testimony from medical
experts. But lay testimony on the sanity issue is admissible, and indeed,
it alone may support a verdict of sanity where expert testimony of in-
sanity was presented by the defense.116 In a particular case, therefore,
the prosecutor might seek testimony on the issue of defendant's sanity
from the defendant's spouse, minister, or perhaps even his attorney,
claiming that the above statutory provision abolishes the evidentiary
privilege in a sanity trial.
It seems clear that if medical experts testify on the sanity issue,
the state may not question them regarding admissions made by the
defendant during the course of the mental examination on which
their expert opinions are based. 197 In Parkin v. State, 19 8 however, the
supreme court found this not to be true "if the defendant's counsel
opens the inquiry to collateral issues, admissions or guilt . . .," in which
case the prosecution "could inquire within the scope opened by the
and mens rea. See McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Reid
v. Florida Real Estate Comm., 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), overruled in
part sub nom. Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298, 303-04 (Fla. 1967).
In State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715 (Ariz. 1970), the Arizona Supreme Court held viola-
tive of due process Arizona's bifurcated procedure which was interpreted as not per-
mitting introduction of evidence regarding mental illness on the mens rea issue. The
Florida statute, if interpreted as suggested above, would not be subject to attack on
this ground. If it is interpreted to separate the mens rea and insanity issues, it could
be attacked not only on due process grounds but also as violative of equal protection,
since it would selectively deprive the defendant of the lenity effect of testimony on
mental illness but not of other types of ameliorative evidence.
194. Similar language may also be found in FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1975), regarding
the separate sentencing proceeding in death penalty cases.
195. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.502-.506 (1976 Supp.), as amended by Act of May 31, 1977,
ch. 77-77, 1977 Fla. Laws 131, for an enumeration of the relevant privileges.
196. Davis v. State, 319 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Williams v. State,
275 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
197. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
198. 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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defense." 199 This rule is grounded on the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, not the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and there-
fore is unaffected by the statutory elimination of nonconstitutional
exclusionary rules.20 0 The Parkin court appeared to rest on the theory
that although testimony regarding statements made by the defendant
to an examining psychiatrist would be relevant and admissible on the
issue of sanity, its prejudicial effect on the guilt question implicates
the privilege against self-incrimination and forbids its admission unless
defense counsel opens the inquiry. 201 If the bifurcated procedure is
interpreted as totally separating the guilt question from the insanity
issue, then the Parkin rationale may fall, for there would no longer
be prejudicial spillover to the guilt issue. The state could fully examine
state-appointed and defense experts on the content of their interviews
with the defendant. In many cases, this would undoubtedly harden the
jury's conclusion of factual guilt and make an insanity verdict less likely.
Finally, the bifurcated procedure will in some respects aid the
defense. A medical expert may base his opinion on facts related to
him by the defendant which are not established by the defense at
trial.2 0 2 The jury may be instructed to reject the expert's opinion if
it is based on facts which are not ultimately proven.2 13 Such action
199. Id. at 820.
200. Under the Florida statutory provisions on privilege, there is no privilege if
the patient introduced his mental condition as a defense in a criminal prosecution. FLA.
STAT. § 90.242(3)(b) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(c) (1976 Supp.), as amended by Act
of May 31, 1977, ch. 77-77, 1977 Fla. Laws 131.
201. The court stated:
The insanity plea and the guilty plea raise separate issue [sic] on which different
kinds of evidence may be introduced. As a general rule, if evidence is admissible
on one issue and inadmissible on another, the Court may allow the evidence to
come in. However, the trial judge does possess discretion in excluding evidence
admissible on one issue if its probative value on that issue is insufficient to out-
weigh its prejudicial effect on other issues.
238 So. 2d at 820 (citation omitted). Later, the court added:
A defendant pleading insanity may in the end prove himself guilty while
trying to prove himself insane; this is a risk he must take. However, he may
not be compelled to prove himself either. Self-incrimination is not directly an
issue in cases such as this, simply because the question to be resolved is not guilt
or innocence, but the presence or absence of mental illness.
Id. at 821.
202. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974).
203. In Smith v. State, 314 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), defense
psychiatrists based their opinion of insanity partially on the claim related to them by
the defendant that the victim, defendant's girl friend, told defendant shortly before
the homicide that she had earlier that day had intercourse with another man. The
defense proffered testimony to prove that such intercourse had occurred. The trial
court dxcluded such testimony and the appeals court affirmed, ruling that such evidence
would be inadmissible unless the defendant first proved that the victim had in fact
told him of the intercourse. Since the defendant did not take the stand, he had not
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may force the defendant to testify in order to prove the facts on which
his insanity claim is based where he would otherwise prefer to remain
silent. Under the bifurcated procedure, the defendant could testify
without exposing himself to cross-examination on factual guilt. It has
also been held that although testimony or prosecutorial comment
on the defendant's exercise of his right to silence after arrest is
generally reversible error, such testimony may be admissible if the
defendant places his sanity in issue.2 0 4 The bifurcated procedure will
insulate the decision of factual guilt from the arguably prejudicial
effect of this evidence.
Subsection 921.131(2) specifies the consequences of a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court may commit the defendant
to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services if it deter-
mines the defendant meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization,
but this disposition is not required. The court may order outpatient
treatment or simply discharge the accused.2 0 5 The statute thus con-
templates permanent involuntary commitments upon order of the
criminal trial judge without following the procedures for civil in-
voluntary hospitalization specified in subsection 394.467(2), Florida
Statutes.2°6 There are substantial differences in the two procedures.
Under subsection 394.467(2), court-ordered involuntary hospitaliza-
tion requires an evaluation of the defendant to determine whether he
presently meets the criteria for civil commitment. The affirmative
recommendation of the administrator of the receiving facility, sup-
ported by the opinions of two physicians who have examined the de-
fendant within the preceding five days, is required for commitment.
New subsection 921.131(2) does not require a hearing or specify any
procedures which must be followed in making the determination that
the defendant presently meets the criteria for civil commitment. It
requires only that the trial judge make such a determination prior to
ordering commitment, and the judge could apparently make such a
determination without receiving any further evidence. In this respect
subsection 921.131(2) is identical to Rules 3.210(e)(9) and 3.460 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 0 T
established the necessary predicate. The court also approved the trial court's instruc-
tion that the jury could reject the psychiatrist's testimony if the facts on which it was
based had not been proven.
204. Greenfield v. State, 337 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
205. Rule 3.210(e)(9), as amended, is essentially identical.
206. (1975).
207. Section 10 of House Bill 35 repeals Rule 3.210 effective 90 days after July 1,
1977. Rule 3.210 sections (d) and (e) were added by the 1977 amendments to specify
procedures for dealing with a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity. Although these
sections clearly superseded Rule 3.460, which covered the same subject, the 1977 amend-
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In Powell v. Genung,2 s the trial judge ordered, under Rule 3.460,
the commitment of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity. The
judge, "after considering the evidence adduced at the trial, the plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity and the jury's verdict, '' 209 concluded
release would have been manifestly dangerous to the pdace and safety
of the people. Subsequently, the superintendent of the state hospital
informed the trial court by letter that the patient, Powell, was no
longer dangerous to others and continued hospitalization was not
necessary. After a hearing, however, the trial court ruled that hospitali-
zation should be continued. Powell then filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court, attacking both the original
order of commitment and the order of continued hospitalization. The
court held both orders valid but in its opinion discussed only the
validity of the second order. The opinion, citing Baxstrom v. Herold210
and Jackson v. Indiana,2 11 stated in a footnote2 12 that its decision
was consistent with them since "[t]hose decisions deal with the right
to a hearing before commitment to a mental hospital." The basis of
the alleged consistency is not clear: the teaching of Baxstrom and
Jackson is that a criminal conviction does not justify procedures for
commitment which differ substantially from civil commitment pro-
cedures, and the patient in Powell was attacking both the original order
of commitment and the order of continued hospitalization.
Powell then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The petition
was granted and Powell ordered released. 213 The report and recommen-
dation of the United States Magistrate found that the original order
ments do not eliminate Rule 3.460, and it was not repealed by § 10 of House Bill 35.
The provisions of Rule 3.460 and § 921.131(2) regarding commitment of a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity differ slightly. Rule 3.460 specifies that the judge "shall
order [the defendant] to be committed to jail or otherwise to be cared for as an
insane person" if release is "considered by the court manifestly dangerous to the peace
and safety of the people .... ." Section 921.131(2) states the defendant "may be com-
mitted to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by the
trial court if the court determines the person presently meets the criteria for involun-
tary hospitalization" or the court may order outpatient treatment. The criteria for in-
voluntary hospitalization specified by FLA. STAT. § 394.467(l)(a)-(b) (1975) require the
person to be: "(a) [l]ikely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty,
or (b) [i]n need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible
application on his own behalf." In theory, a defendant could be committed under the
criteria of (b) but not meet the standard of Rule 3.460.
208. 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974).
209. Id. at 114.
210. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
211. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
212. 306 So. 2d at 116 n.3.
213. Powell v. Ivory, No. 75-44 Civ. T.H. (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 1977).
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of commitment after acquittal by reason of insanity violated both due
process and equal protection guarantees. On the due process point,
the magistrate stated:
Petitioner was not afforded a new finding of fact following his
acquittal concerning his mental condition at that time (as opposed
to at the time of the offense which the trial itself had decided). He was
not afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses
nor the right to offer his own evidence. The trial judge was not re-
quired to and did not make findings of fact adequate to make mean-
ingful his right to appeal (the finding by the trial judge that
petitioner was "manifestly dangerous" was a conclusion, not a find-
ing of fact). Basically, the petitioner was subjected to the whim of
the trial judge in spite of his acquittal.214
Regarding the equal protection violations, the magistrate stated:
It is equally clear that petitioner's original commitment violated
his right to equal protection of the law as the procedures under Rule
3.460 substantially differed from the civil commitment procedures
under F.S.§394. As stated in [Bolton v. Harris, 395 F. 2d 642, 647
(D.C. Civ. 1968)] "the commission of criminal acts alone does not
give rise to a presumption of dangerousness which, standing alone,
justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures..." See
Baxstrom and its progeny.215
The magistrate further determined that the subsequent hearing by
the trial court to determine whether Powell should be released rendered
the original due process violation moot since the patient then had the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses16 The equal
protection violation was not rendered moot by the subsequent hearing,
however, since the trial court rejected all the medical evidence. Thus,
Powell could not have been originally committed under the evidence
subsequently received, since section 394.467(2) requires a recommenda-
tion of involuntary hospitalization. by the facility administrator sup-
ported by the opinions of two examining physicians.2 17
214. Id. slip op. at 7-8. The report relied heavily on Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967), and Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in the due process
discussion.
215. Powell v. Ivory, slip op. at 8.
216. Id. The report of the magistrate does not discuss the due process requirement
that adequate findings of fact be made to make meaningful the right of appeal. At the
second hearing regarding hospitalization, the trial judge found "from the evidence that
the underlying psychosis remains even though the symptoms are in a state of remission."
Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. 1974).
217. Powell v. Ivory, slip. op. at 9.
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It seems clear that new subsection 921.131(2) is open to the same
constitutional objections as Rule 3.460. A constitutionally acceptable
procedure would have paralleled section 918.16218 regarding evaluation
of a defendant for competency to stand trial. Such a procedure would
permit short term detention after acquittal for evaluation of the defend-
ant by medical personnel to determine if the defendant presently meets
the criteria for civil commitment and then for a hearing on that issue.219
Although subsection 921.131(2) does not require such procedures, the
trial court could adopt them, of course. The trial judge's decision
would then be dependent on the evidence received-and reviewable on
that basis-rather than remaining essentially a matter for his discre-
tion.
The issue of the validity of an order of commitment following an
insanity acquittal also arose in In re Connors.2 2 0 There, as in Powell v.
Genung,22 1 the defendant had been committed under Rule 3.460. The
court found the commitment order lawful, stating its decision was con-
trolled by Powell. In response to the argument based on Baxstrom v.
Herold,22 2 the court stated that the "defendant was given a hearing
immediately following her adjudication of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity to determine her mental condition and the danger posed thereby
to the community at this time. At this hearing, defense counsel was
present and both sides stipulated to the doctors' reports.
' '2 2 3
Arguably, therefore, the trial court adopted constitutional proce-
dures although not required to do so by Rule 3.460, and the supreme
court found the trial court's modification constitutionally adequate.
The facts as revealed by Justice Hatchett's dissent,224 however, show
that only a single hearing, which apparently amounted to a non-jury
trial on the charges of auto theft and petit larceny, was held. The
principal issue was whether defendant was insane at the time of the
crime, and the trial court entered an acquittal on that ground. The
218. See text accompanying notes 160-71 supra.
219. See the discussion in Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
supporting the adoption of such a procedure.
220. 332 So. 2d 336 (Fla.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 525 (1976).
221. 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974).
222. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
223. 332 So. 2d at 339.
224. Justice Hatchett dissented on the basis that since the patient Connors had
dropped out of the litigation, no case or controversy existed. The only remaining issue
was an abstract controversy between the trial judge and the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services regarding the interrelationship of Rule 3.460 and FLA. STAT.
§ 394.467(3)(b) (1975), which prior to amendment by § 2 of House Bill 35, stated that
full civil commitment was required after acquittal by reason of insanity.
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"doctors' reports" alluded to by the majority225 refer to defendant's
competency to stand trial and her insanity at the time of the crime.
The reports do not mention the criteria for civil commitment and do
not explicitly deal with that issue, although neither concluded that
defendant should be involuntarily hospitalized. 26  The trial court
nevertheless concluded, without making findings of fact based upon
the medical reports, that discharge of the defendant would be mani-
festly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people.22 7
In sum, the Florida Supreme Court has never expressly and per-
suasively answered the contention that involuntary hospitalization of
a defendant acquitted on the insanity ground requires procedures,
as well as substantive criteria, which are substantially the same as
for civil commitment. New subsection 921.131(2) retains the constitu-
tional objections inherent in Rules 3.460 and 3.210(e)(9) and might
be successfully attacked, at least in federal court, on that basis.
Baxstrom and Jackson also stand firmly for the proposition that
release of one committed after a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity should not differ in significant substantive or procedural
respects from civil release from involuntary hospitalization. Under
the general civil commitment provisions, an involuntarily hospitalized
patient may be discharged if the hospital administrator finds he no
longer meets the required criteria for commitment.228 If the adminis-
trator concludes that hospitalization is required beyond a six-month
period, the patient is entitled to a hearing before a hearing examiner
appointed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.229
The examiner may order release of the patient or continued hospitaliza-
225. 332 So. 2d 339. The reports are set forth in full at 332 So. 2d 343-46 n.6
(Hatchett, J., dissenting).
226. Dr. W. H. McConnell recommended "[t]hat [defendant] be put on probation
and let out of jail only so long as she remains under the active care of a qualified
doctor or clinic who would be empowered to hospitalize her whenever she becomes
periodically incompetent." 332 So. 2d at 345 n.6. Dr. Peter J. Spoto concluded, "The
patient should have continued treatment at the local Mental Health Clinic." Id.
227. An important issue in the Connors case was whether FLA. STAT. § 394.467(3)(b)
(1975), which required that a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity be civilly com-
mitted under ch. 394, prevailed over Rule 3.460, permitting commitment upon order
of the trial judge. The court concluded, with minimal explanation, that "[t]o the extent
that section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, attempts to derogate the authority of the
committing judge set out in Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P. [sic], such statutory provision is super-
seded thereby." 332 So. 2d at 340. This issue was rendered moot by House Bill 35, § 2,
which amended out of § 394.467(3)(b) the language requiring civil commitment. This
is consistent with the provisions of § 921.131(2) permitting hospitalization upon a
determination by the trial judge that, the defendant meets the criteria for civil commit-
ment.
228. FLA. STAT. § 394.469 (1975).
229. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.457(6), .467(4) (1975).
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tion for a period of up to one year.2 30 The order of the hearing officer
is reviewable by the circuit court of the county in which the hearing
is held or by the court of original jurisdiction. 231 Hence, the hospital
administrator may exercise his discretion to release an involuntarily
hospitalized patient but may not retain such a patient for more than
six months without authorization of a hearing examiner or waiver of a
hearing by the patient.
As originally enacted in 1971, chapter 394 contained no special
provision for release of those involuntarily hospitalized after an in-
sanity acquittal. 23 2 However, in 1975 the legislature enacted section
394.467(5), which provided that such a patient remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the committing court, that the administrator could not
release such a patient without first notifying the state attorney who
could request a hearing before the hearing examiner, and that the
hearing examiner's findings could be reviewed by a jury trial233 on
the issue of whether the patient continued to meet the criteria for in-
voluntary hospitalization. 234 Rule 3.460 was also amended by the su-
preme court in 1974 to provide that a defendant acquitted by reason
of insanity "shall be held in custody until released by order of the
committing court. ... 233 The 1977 amendment to the rules of criminal
procedure created Rule 3.210(e)(9), which provides that "[t]he court
committing the defendant shall at all times retain jurisdiction of the
cause and shall make all determinations relative to continued
hospitalization . . .or release of the defendant." Subsection (f) of the
same rule provides that the hearing examiner shall have no authority
over the release decision but shall make recommendations only to the
committing court. The possible conflict between Rule 3.210(e)(9)-(f)
and section 394.467(5), regarding the role of the hearing examiner
and the availability of a jury trial, was eliminated by section 10 of
House Bill 35, which repealed Rule 3.210 effective 90 days after July
1, 1977.236
Section 2 of House Bill 35 amends subsection 394.467(5) to clarify
certain ambiguities in that provision, but by repealing Rule 3.210, it
230. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(4)(f) (1975).
231. FLA. STAT. § 394.457(6)(d) (1975).
232. Act of June 15, 1971, ch. 71-131, §§ 9-10, 1971 Fla. Laws 345.
233. The trial would presumably be presided over by the original criminal trial
judge, although this was not explicitly stated.
234. FiA. STAT. § 394.467(5) (1975).
235. In re Rule 3.460, 287 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1974).
* 236, Section 10 of House Bill 35 does not explicitly repeal Rule 3.460 and makes
no mention of this rule. Rule 3.210(e)(9)-(f) duplicated Rule 3.460. It was probably
not the legislative intent to resurrect Rule 3.460 by repealing Rule 3.210, since House
Bill 35 retains and amends § 394.467(5) regarding the release of patients committed
after an insanity acquittal.
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also reaffirms the procedures of 394.467(5) governing the release of
insanity-acquitted patients. As amended, subsection 394.467(5) states
that the administrator may not release an insanity-acquitted patient
without thirty days notice to the state attorney from the committing
county. The state attorney ,may request a hearing on the release ques-
tion. If no hearing is requested, apparently the administrator may
release the patient on the same basis as any other involuntarily
hospitalized patient. On this point, subsection 394.467(5), as amended,
is in definite conflict with Rule 3.460, which was hot repealed by
section 10 of House Bill 35 and which requires a court order prior
to release. The issue of whether the authority and procedures govern-
ing release of insanity-acquitted patients is substantive or procedural
may eventually be resolved by the supreme court, or the court may
avoid such a decision by promulgating a new rule which adopts sub-
section 394.467(5), as amended. 237 If the administrator seeks to retain
the patient and the patient exercises his right to a hearing as provided
in subsections 394.467(3)(b) and (4), the state attorney must likewise
be notified and given an opportunity to appear. If the state attorney
does not appear, the hearing examiner's order is final.23 8 If the state
attorney does participate, the losing party has the right to request a
hearing in the circuit court, and the patient has the right to request a
jury trial 3 The only issue at such a hearing is whether the patient
continues to meet the criteria for civil commitment.2
40
237. For recent decisions on the substance versus procedure issue, all decided in
favor of the statute, see State v. Golden, No. 46, 321 (Fla. Feb. 26, 1976) (petition for
rehearing pending); S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); Benyard v. Wainwright.
322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975).
238. Presumably this means only that no further proceedings before the committing
court at the insistence of the state attorney are contemplated. This provision was
probably not intended to deprive the insanity-acquitted patient of the general right
to appeal orders of the hearing examiner provided in FLA. STAT. § 394.457(6)(d) (1975).
239. House Bill 35, supra note 145, § 2 (§ 394.467(5)(b)). Under the statute prior
to amendment, either the state attorney or the patient could request a jury trial. Act
of July 4, 1975, ch. 75-305, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 1117.
240. The statute does not allocate the burden of proof at such a hearing, but
presumably it would rest on the party losing before the hearing examiner.
Since the issue is limited to the present incompetency of the patient, there will
likely be some dispute over the admissibility of the prior acquittal of criminal charges
on insanity grounds. There is ample authority that where sanity is at issue, all evidence
of prior conduct and evidence of a prior adjudication of incompetency are admissible.
2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 223, 228(1) (3d ed. 1940). Under Florida decisions relating
to criminal prosecutions, an adjudication of insanity or incompetency prior to the
alleged criminal act creates a rebuttable presumption of continuing insanity. Clark v.
Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1963); Johnson v. State 118 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct.
App. 1960). The state may argue for a similar presumption of continuing incompetency
based on the trial court's original order of commitment following the acquital. It should
be pointed out, however, that such a determination may be invalid under the procedures
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In the case where the administrator is of the view that the insanity-
acquitted patient should be released, these procedures differ signifi-
cantly and substantially from those governing release of other in-
voluntarily hospitalized patients-since the latter may be released in
the administrator's discretion. This difference almost certainly runs
afoul of the central logic of Baxstrom v. Herold and Jackson v. Indiana
that criminal proceedings involving the patient are not sufficiently
relevant to his present mental condition to justify substantially different
standards or procedures for commitment or release. Nonetheless, there
is perhaps a stronger conflict between the contesting interests here
than in the commitment decision. As seen above, the criminal court
can become the committing court without constitutional objection so
long as it follows procedures and standards equivalent to civil commit-
ment generally. These standards and procedures probably do not pose
much of a barrier to commitment where the court so desires. The
problem arises in that the law regarding civil commitment generally
requires a court order for involuntary hospitalization (and thus the
criminal court may assume that role), but it is willing to entrust the
release decision generally to the discretion of the hospital administrator,
subject to review by the hearing officer if the decision is against release.
Therefore, it would seem under Jackson that once the law opts for
standards and a procedure to govern release of involuntarily admitted
patients, it may not further distinguish those patients involuntarily
admitted after an insanity acquittal. But the pragmatic judgment is
strong that a patient in a hospital who has killed someone is some-
what more of a threat to public safety than a patient who has
attempted suicide-i.e., the patients are not fungible and therefore
the procedures should not be either. Regarding commitment, the
legislature has adopted procedures which can be duplicated by the
criminal court without significant difference in form or outcome. But
regarding release, the legislature is willing to entrust the authority to
presently contemplated by § 921.131(2), Rule 3.210(e)(9), or Rule 3.460. See text ac-
companying notes 205-27 supra. If this is so, then a prior finding that the patient met
the criteria for civil commitment would be inadmissible. The jury's prior verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity would be inadmissible, Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla.
1974), since it is not relevant to the issue of civil commitment. The patient's prior con-
duct which was the basis for the criminal charge might be relevant and admissible, if
it tended to show the patient was likely to injure himself or others, or was in need
of care or treatment-but arguably this would have to be proven by direct testimony.
The state might successfully argue, however, that the jury's verdict at the conclusion
of the first part of the bifurcated trial that defendant committed the alleged criminal
act should be admissible, but only if the alleged criminal act was on its face probative
of the standards of civil commitment. (This might be true of homicide, for instance,
but arguably not of burglary.)
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administrators, subject to review by hearing officers, for civilly com-
mitted patients. This is perhaps due to the belief that usually there
will not be a party contesting the release decision where a prior
criminal proceeding is not involved. In insanity-acquitted cases, how-
ever, the case will undoubtedly arise where the hospital administrator
believes the patient should be released while the hearing examiner (or
more probably, the criminal court or jury) refuses release. Such action
will pose the constitutional issues.141 Perhaps one way to avoid the
problem would be to amend section 394.469, Florida Statutes," 2 to
provide for review by the committing court of the hospital adminis-
trator's release decision for all involuntarily hospitalized patients.
V. THE TRIAL
A. Rule 3.280. Alternate Jurors
This rule was amended to provide that in a prosecution involving
possible conviction of an offense punishable by death, alternate jurors
should not be excused when the jury retires to consider guilt. Rather,
after the jurors retire to consider their verdict, the alternates are to be
241. This was in fact the case in Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974),
where the court ruled the criminal trial court jurisdiction over the release issue, con-
ferred by Rule 3.460, was constitutional. The court distinguished Baxstrom and Jackson
by stating that those decisions dealt with commitment, not release. 306 So. 2d at 116
n.3. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida subsequently
granted the patient Powell's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Powell v. Ivory, No.
75-44 Cir. T.H. (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 1977). The report and recommendation of the U.S.
Magistrate found that the commitment procedures violated equal protection. Regarding
release, however, the magistrate found no equal protection violation in the vesting of
jurisdiction over the release of insanity-acquitted patients in the criminal court. The
magistrate simply relied on Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1968), which
states without supporting analysis: "We do not think equal protection is offended by
allowing the Government or the court the opportunity to insure that the standards for
the release of civilly committed patients are faithfully applied to . . . patients [acquitted
by reason of insanity]." Bolton, however, was decided four years prior to Jackson.
In United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court held constitutional
a District of Columbia statute requiring court review of a hospital proposal for condi-
tional release of a patient committed after an insanity-acquittal, whereas no such review
Was required for other patients. The court recognized that language in Jackson and
Baxstrom strongly indicated the procedural difference was unconstitutional, id. at 197 &
n.74, but distinguished Jackson on the basis that it found only that the release standards
were unconstitutional. Id. at 198. The court was of the further view that different pro-
cedures for insanity-acquittees were constitutionally permissible since they had clearly
demonstrated a propensity for serious anti-social behavior. Id. at 197. Relying on
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), however, the court held that the difference in
procedures could be constitutionally tolerated only for a period of hospitalization
equal to the maximum sentence the patient could have received were he not found
insane. Id. at 198.
See also Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052 (D.S.D. 1977) and cases cited therein.
242. (1975).
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excused but told they may have to return for an additional hearing if
the defendant is convicted of a capital offense. 24 3
B. Rule 3.350. Peremptory Challenges
The amendment permits the trial judge to grant extra peremptory
challenges to the state where the defendant is on trial for more than
one offense if the state or defendant may be otherwise prejudiced. The
rule prior to amendment granted this only to the defendant where he
might have been prejudiced.2 44 The rule always provided that if extra
peremptory challenges were granted one side, the other side had to be
allowed an equal number; thus, the only effect of the amendment is
to extend to the state as well as the defense the right to request them.4 5
VI. CONDUCT OF TRIAL; JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Rule 3.390. Jury Instructions
Prior to amendment, Rule 3.390(a) provided: "The presiding
judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case ... and must
include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense for
which the accused is then on trial." After much confusing litigation,
the Florida Supreme Court finally resolved in Johnson v. State2 46 that
this language was directory only, and failure to instruct on "the penalty
fixed by law" upon request by the defendant was not error. Although
the result in Johnson was contrary to the plain meaning of the words
of the rule, since the rule itself was a creation of the court, the decision
amounted to a de facto amendment of the rule by substituting "may"
for "must."2 47
243. The same procedure should be adopted regarding the bifurcated trial where
insanity has been raised as a defense.
244. Sanders v. State, 328 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 So, 2d
1184 (Fla. 1976), held the granting of extra peremptory challenges on motion of the
state, under the rule prior to amendment, was reversible error per se.
245. It should be noted that extra peremptory challenges may be granted only
in trials involving multiple offenses. The granting of extra peremptory challenges on
motion of the state in a single count trial would be reversible error. Moore v. State, 335
So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
246. 308 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1974).
247. The theory of the Johnson decision was that identical language in a prior
statute had previously been construed by the court as directory in Simmons v. State,
36 So. 2d 207 (1948). The primary rationale of Simmons was that the legislature could
not interfere in that manner with the judicial functions. There was also language in
Simmons indicating the statute was not a very good idea. When the court adopted
the same language in amended Rule 3.390, however, it presumably decided that it was
a good idea, and at the same time removed the objection of legislative interference
with the judicial function.
FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The rule was amended to read: "The presiding judge shall charge
the jury only upon the law of the case ... and upon request of either
the state or the defendant the judge shall include in said charge
the maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed (in-
cluding probation) for the offense for which the accused is then on
trial." Presumably the intent of this change was to require the trial
court to give such a charge upon request. Failure to do so at the
request of the defense may now be reversible error, but the language,
although more explicit, is no more mandatory than the rule prior to
amendment. When the court interpreted "must" to mean "may," it
rendered uncertain the effect of mandatory language ("shall", as used
in the amendment, is if anything less mandatory than "must").24 8
Thus, the only explicit alternative available to the court in drafting
an amendment would have been to state the consequences of judicial
refusal to give the charge in the rule itself, or at least to append a
committee note explaining the intent of the rule change. There is
no committee note.
If the obligation to charge on penalty is indeed mandatory, an un-
settled issue is whether such an instruction must be given for the
lesser included offenses as well as for the offense charged. The language
of the rule, which was unchanged by the amendment, is ambiguous,
although the defendant is undeniably "then on trial" for lesser in-
cluded offenses. Before Johnson v. State declared the judicial obliga-
tion discretionary, there was a split of authority on whether the obliga-
tion extended to lesser included offenses.2 49
A closely related issue is whether the court must, upon request,
instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity. The supreme court held it was reversible error to
refuse such an instruction in Roberts v. State.2 50
VII. THE VERDICT
A. Rule 3.505. Inconsistent Verdicts
This is a new rule which permits the trial court to submit the
case to the jury on alternative counts which are mutually inconsistent.
It would no longer be necessary, for instance, for the state to elect
248. See State v. Terry, 336 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976) (Hatchett, J., concurring),
recognizing the problem in interpretation created by Johnson.
249. Compare Terry v. State, 302 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 336 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976) (assuming without discussion that the
obligation extended to lesser included offenses) with Settle v. State, 288 So. 2d 5,11 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1974), (holding the obligation ex-
tended only to "the offense charged," although that is not the language of the rule).
250. 335 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1976). In Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977), the
court held Roberts applied to all cases pending an appeal at the time of the decision.
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between the counts of larceny and of receiving stolen goods (which
have been held to be inconsistent), as long as there was sufficient
evidence to go to the jury on both counts. The jury should be in-
structed that a guilty verdict could not be returned on both counts.2 51
VIII. JUDGMENT
A. Rule 3.691. Post-Trial Release
The rule was amended to comply with section 903.132, Florida
Statutes,2 5 2 which repealed that portion of Rule 3.691(a) indicating
that bail after conviction was a matter of judicial discretion in all
cases. 2 3 The rule as amended adopts the provisions of section 903.132
that bail must be denied a defendant convicted of a felony, who had a
prior felony conviction for a felony committed before the felony in-
volved in the case on appeal, or a pending felony charge on which
probable cause has been found. The rule as amended thus presents
some curious anomalies. If the defendant has a prior felony conviction,
the felony must have been committed before the second felony;
whereas if he has a pending felony charge, it does not matter whether
it was committed before or after the felony on which the defendant
has been convicted and is seeking an appeal. Thus a defendant tried
and convicted first for his second felony might obtain bail on appeal
if the charge for his first felony has not yet been filed. If the defendant
is then charged and convicted for his first felony, he might obtain bail
on appeal since his prior conviction is not for a felony occurring before
the felony he is appealing. This admittedly contemplates an unusual
situation, but it is nevertheless possible under the rule. Perhaps more
objectionable is that a defendant simultaneously convicted of two or
more felonies may obtain bail on appeal, whereas the defendant who
has only pending charges may not. These apparently arbitrary classi-
fications open the rule to attack on an equal protection theory.
The amendment also adds subsection (c) providing for expedited
appellate review of the denial of bail on appeal. 54
251. For a discussion of the prior decisional law requiring election of offenses, see
Johnson v. State, 333 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1085
(Fla. 1976), and cases discussed therein.
252. (1976 Supp.).
253. Bamber v. State, 300 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), held the pro-
vision of a prior statute requiring denial of bail after a felony conviction if the de-
fendant had previously been convicted of a felony was procedural in nature and thus
unconstitutional. The court ruled bail was discretionary in all cases under Rule 3.691(a).
Accord, Rolle v. State, 314 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 334
So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1976).
254. See FLA. App. R. 6.15(d), providing for appellate review of the denial of bail
without requiring a full record on appeal.
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B. Rule 3.692. Motion To Expunge
This is a new rule setting forth procedures for expunging official
court records where the movant is so entitled under sections 893.14(2)
and 901.33, Florida Statutes.2 5 5 The supreme court previously held
that insofar as section 901.33 specified procedures for expungement
of court records, it was an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial
powers.25 The court recognized, however, the validity of the substan-
tive right to expungement under the circumstances specified in section
901.33.257 The rule was therefore necessary to implement the rights
provided by the legislature. 251
IX. SENTENCE
A. Rule 3.722. Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences-Repealed
This rule was repealed to comply with Benyard v. Wainwright,25 9
which held that since the question was substantive, not procedural,
the provisions of section 921.16, Florida Statutes, 26  prevailed over
the rule. The trial court in its discretion may impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences for multiple convictions.2 6 1 The rule was relevant
where the trial court had remained silent as to the concurrent or con-
secutive nature of the sentences. The repealed rule provided that
failure to designate the sentences as consecutive would render them
concurrent. Under section 921.16, the result is the same except that
non-designated sentences are consecutive if not charged in the same
indictment or information.
B. Rule 3.780. Sentencing Hearing for Capital Cases
This is a new rule intended to answer some procedural questions
255. (1975).
256. Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1976).
257. Id. at 95.
258. Some interesting decisions have come down regarding the circumstances under
which a person is entitled to expungement. See State v. Zawistowski, 339 So. 2d 315 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Maxwell v. State, 336 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
259. 322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975).
260. (1,975).
261. The "single transaction rule" of sentencing was an exception to this general
proposition. Under that doctrine, if the defendant was convicted of multiple offenses
which were contained in the same charging instrument and were faced with the same
transaction, the judge could impose a sentence only for the highest offense charged. The
single transaction rule was severely limited by judicial decision, see, e.g., Estevez v. State,
313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975), and finally abrogated by statute. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1976
Supp.). Some later decisions indicate the doctrine may linger on, however. See Masters
v. State, 344 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Zyglado v. State, 341 So. 2d
1053 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Morey, 339 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App, 1976); Miller v. State, 339 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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regarding the conduct of a sentencing trial in a capital case under sec-
tion 921.141, Florida Statutes. 26 2 It provides for cross-examination by
both sides. The state shall present evidence of an aggravating nature
first, but the trial judge shall also permit rebuttal testimony. Finally,
each side shall have one argument to the jury with the state arguing
first. 263
C. Rule 3.800. Correction and Reduction of Sentences
Under the rule prior to amendment, the trial court could reduce
a legal sentence at any time during the same term of court. If the
term ended less than sixty days from the date the sentence had been
imposed, then the time was sixty days from the date of imposition of
sentence. The amendment specifies that a legal sentence may be reduced
within sixty days of imposition and eliminates the "same term of
court" language, thus shortening the applicable time where more than
sixty days remain in the court term.
The amendment also provides in 3800(b) that the provisions re-
garding the reduction of a legal sentence shall not apply "to those
cases in which the death sentence is imposed or those cases where the
trial judge has imposed the minimum mandatory sentence or has no
sentencing discretion." The rule provides elsewhere that the trial court
may reduce a legal sentence within sixty days after the entering of a
final order disposing of the case by the highest court to which petition
for writ of certiorari has been taken under authority of law. The pro-
262. (1975).
263. It is beyond the scope of this article to comment in detail on the issues which
have arisen regarding the conduct of the penalty trial under FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1975),
but the emerging issues include: (1) Should the admissibility of evidence be strictly
limited to the specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances? See Cooper v. State,
336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976). (2) Should the sentencing judge be permitted, or perhaps
required, to consult a presentence investigation report before sentencing? See Provence
v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976); Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d I (Fla. 1976); Douglas
v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976); Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1975). See also
Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977). (3) To what extent should the state's cross-
examination of the defendant be limited? See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973),
cert. denied sub nom. Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). (4) What is the burden
of proof on the defense in establishing mitigating circumstances (aggravating circum-
stances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt), and does proof of two mitigating
circumstances necessarily outweigh proof of one aggravating circumstance? See id.
(5) Should the jury be instructed on aggravating or mitigating circumstances for which no
proof has been offered? See Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976). (6) What is the
effect of a jury recommendation of mercy followed by the judicial imposition of the
death penalty? See Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977); Dobbert v. State, 328
So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976); Tedder v. State, 322
So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975). (7) How are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be
applied in a non-homicide case? See_ Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2.d 4 (Fla. 1977).-
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vision regarding the death penalty, therefore, might be construed as
having removed the sixty-day time limit to permit the trial court to
vacate the death penalty at any time before execution. The context
indicates, however, that the intent of the amendment was to prohibit
the trial court from vacating the death penalty once it had been im-
posed. This would apply even where the trial court sought to do so
within sixty days of imposition. The only apparent rationale for
exemption of the death penalty from the general provisions for a
reduction of sentence would seem to be to protect the trial judge
from the pressures inherent in reevaluating the death penalty after
its imposition has become relatively certain.
X. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
A. Rule 3.850. Motion To Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence; Hearing; Appeal
This amendment specifies the required contents for a motion under
the rule26 4 and that the motion may be refused if it is not in sub-
stantial compliance. Although the rule does not so require, pre-
sumably the prisoner would be notified of the requirements of the
rule at the time his motion is refused.2 65
The amendment also adds the provision that if the motion is denied
because the prisoner's contentions are conclusively refuted by files and
records in the case, a copy of the relevant portions shall be attached
to the order of denial. The order must further inform the prisoner
that he has a right to appeal within thirty days of the rendition of the
order,216 and requires that the clerk "shall promptly serve upon the
prisoner a copy of [the] order ....... The thirty-day time limit for
264. The rule states:
The motion shall be under oath and include the following information:
(a) The judgment or sentence under attack and the court which rendered
the same;
(b) Whether there was an appeal from the judgment or sentence and the
disposition thereof;
(c) Whether a previous post-conviction motion has been filed, and if so, how
many;
(d) The nature of the relief sought;
(e) A brief statement of the facts (rather than conclusions) relied upon in
support of the motion.
265. The recent decision in Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), regarding the
access of prisoners to adequate law libraries, is pertinent here.
266. FLA. App. R. 1.3 states:
Rendition of a judgment, decision, order or decree means that it has been
reduced to writing, signed and made a matter of record, or if recording is not_
required then filed. A paper is deemed to be recorded when filed with the clerk
and assigned a book and a page number.
See also Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975).
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appeal is consistent with appellate provisions generally, but in the
special case of appeals by prisoners it is not difficult to envision the
case where delay in actual notice to the prisoner of denial of his motion
would leave very little time to prepare and file a notice of appeal. In
this circumstance the prisoner should not forfeit his right to appeal
because of derelictions by the clerk or prison officials. 26 The amend-
ment also adds the provision that a prisoner may file a motion for a
rehearing of the denial of his motion within fifteen days of the date
of service of the order. The time here is not pegged to the rendition
date, which date could be somewhat before the date of service.2 68 Al-
though the rule requires notice of the right to appeal, no such require-
ment is included regarding the right to rehearing.
267. Cf. Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969) and Hollingshead v.
Wainright, 194 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1967) (granting the right to belated appeal where
there has been a prior procedural default by court-appointed counsel).
268. Under Rule 3.070, if service is by mail, three days should be added to the
prescribed period.
